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Definition of terms
Civil society organisation: Civil society is a space where 
citizens collectively assemble to share concerns and mobilise 
around particular issues and affairs. Civil society organisations 
include faith-based associations, labour movements, local 
community groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Code of conduct/ethics: A formal statement of the values 
and business practices of an organisation and sometimes its 
affiliates. A code is a statement of minimum standards together 
with a pledge by the organisation to observe them and to 
require its contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and licensees 
to observe them. 
Executive body: The body elected or appointed to carry out 
the normal business of the organisation in accordance with the 
governing articles and, where applicable, under the direction of 
the governing body. Members may, in addition, have statutory 
responsibility (e.g. company directors).
Global Governance: “…rule making and power-exercise of 
power at global level, but not necessarily by entities authorised 
by general agreement to act. Global governance can be 
exercised by states, religious organisations and business 
corporations, but also intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations.” 1
Global Public Goods: Services and conditions that are 
essential for individuals and communities to be able to live 
without poverty and threats to life and well-being, and enjoy 
human rights. Global public goods include natural commons 
(such as a sustainable environment, water, or a stable climate), 
human made commons (such as transport, communication, 
shelter, and other infrastructure), and global policy outcomes 
(such as health, education, justice, freedom from discrimination, 
access to opportunity).2
Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs): International 
organisations whose members are two or more governments or 
state agencies. Within the context of the Global Accountability 
Report, inter-agency coordinating mechanisms and hybrid 
institutional arrangements between intergovernmental agencies 
are also classified as IGOs. 
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs): 
NGOs with operations in more than one country. Within the 
context of the Global Accountability Report, other transnational 
civil society associations are also included under this 
categorisation for ease of reference.
Governing body: The governing body has the ultimate authority 
in the organisation. It has the power to amend the governing 
articles and sets the overall direction of the organisation. It 
typically elects or appoints the executive and oversees its 
actions. Other powers may vary.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): A subset of 
civic organisations defined by the fact that they are formally 
registered with government, they receive a significant proportion 
of their income from voluntary contributions, and are governed 
by a board of trustees.3
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5Executive summary
Executive summary
This report summarises the results of the 2009-2010 review 
process on the One World Trust Global Accountability 
Framework and the piloting of the draft framework during 
2011, and presents the full One World Trust Pathways to 
Accountability II indicator framework. Our work in this field work 
is motivated by a concern about the persisting weakness and 
insufficient effectiveness of global organisations from all sectors 
in responding to the challenge of delivering global public goods 
to citizens and communities, the very people whom they claim to 
serve and benefit, and who are most often dependent on them. 
Compounded by failing frameworks of regulation and a lack of 
meaningful opportunities for access of citizens to the decision-
making processes that directly affect them, the result of this 
problematic situation is that many billions of people around 
the world continue to live in conditions of poverty, growing 
environmental threats to their livelihoods, are barred from 
participation in governance, and do not have access to the 
universal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights which 
form the bedrock of the world’s understanding of what it means 
to be human and a global community. 
In line with a perspective on global governance which gives 
it social purpose, engaging in research about organisational 
capacity therefore necessarily has to be about reform. On 
the basis of an analysis of global trends and developments 
in the debate of accountability, and a review of progress and 
bottlenecks with regards to reform at global level, the report 
proceeds to a review of the results of the consultation for the 
future development of the Global Accountability Framework and 
Report. The consultation shows recognised benefits, but also 
challenges; and the need to enable cross-sector learning as a 
specific area of high demand identified by participants. 
Following a review of key areas for change to the existing 
research framework, the report closes with a full presentation 
of the new Pathways to Accountability II indicator framework, 
tried and tested in a pilot stage with a smaller sample of global 
organisations during 2011.
The finalised indicator framework presented in this report 
highlights emerging principles of accountability good practice 
that are applicable across a wide range of organisations, 
but seeks to keep ahead of the curve and offer challenges 
to organisations with an increasing range of governance 
arrangements. Beyond the typical set of intergovernmental, 
non-governmental and corporate business actors, the new 
framework has been designed to assess individual countries’ 
government departments, which may act as influential bilateral 
donors, state-owned corporations (whether in the financial scene 
such as sovereign wealth funds or in the extractive industries), 
major private donors such as foundations or even as individuals, 
multi-stakeholder fora, and private-public partnerships, all of 
which are entering the global governance arena as significant 
actors. Through integration of indicators pertaining to 
accountability performance management, the framework gives 
a better picture of how organisational accountability practice 
is aligned with the capabilities of the institution derived from its 
policies and management systems.
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1.0 Introduction
Since we first piloted the Global Accountability Report in 
2003, it has evolved into a powerful tool for understanding 
accountability across sectors, highlighting accountability 
gaps, encouraging the sharing of good practice, and 
advancing reforms within organisations to strengthen 
accountability to the people they affect. 
In the process of assessing, to date, more than 90 global 
organisations, we have gained significant insight into 
how to develop a methodology and ensure the integrity 
of our results. However, we have also learnt a lot about 
the challenges to measuring accountability in the face of 
diverse organisational structures and ways of working. 
There are areas in which our existing indicator framework 
is strong and where, as with every research framework, 
it could be improved. We are also aware that since we 
developed the Report, debates on accountability have 
moved forward and best practice has evolved. Therefore, 
to ensure the Global Accountability Report remains a 
relevant and critical tool for strengthening the accountability 
of global organisations, we set out in 2009 to review the 
methodology and indicators. 
The following report presents the outcome of this review. 
It summarises what we heard, both good and bad, and 
maps out what changes we have made to the Global 
Accountability Framework, which underpins the Global 
Accountability Report. The report also revisits trends and 
developments in the global accountability debate and 
in different sectors to understand where further work 
is needed, and why and how the Global Accountability 
Report continues to be relevant. In doing so, it makes 
the case that strengthening the accountability of global 
governance institutions is more important than ever.
The report is divided into two parts: the report and the 
indicator tables. In part one, the report, an executive 
summary is followed by this introduction. Section 2 reviews 
the trends and developments in the accountability reform 
debate. Section 3 outlines some of the key challenges 
arising for the future from the current state of debate and 
progress of accountability reform at global level. Section 
4 outlines the review process and the main themes that 
emerged from the consultation. Building on this feedback, 
section 5 then identifies the changes we have made to 
the framework as the underlying methodology. Part two 
presents the revised framework in detail in form of tabled 
indicators and corresponding scores. The document 
concludes with an annex listing the contributors to the 
review process.
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 ICANN coordinates the global internet’s system of unique identifiers and ensures the stable and secure operation of the internet’s unique identifier 
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standards development.
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 Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1996): The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, available at: www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/index.html
2.1 A review of global developments
Since we first started our work on the accountability 
of global organisations with our Charter 99 for Global 
Democracy ahead of the 2000 Millennium Summit, 
we have seen a mushrooming of activity in this area. 
Growing numbers of organisations from all sectors are 
recognising that being open and transparent, engaging 
stakeholders, evaluating and learning, and responding to 
complaints is crucial to their legitimacy and effectiveness. 
Critically, many organisations have moved over the 
past decade from recognising the importance of the 
issue to addressing it in practical terms: identifying to 
whom and for what they are accountable, outlining their 
commitments in form of publicly available policies, and 
developing supporting mechanisms and structures. 
2.2 Dynamics in the international 
non-governmental field
Among INGOs, particularly over the past five years, there 
has been considerable growth in both organisational and 
sector-wide accountability initiatives. Organisations such 
as ActionAid International, Plan International and WWF 
International have all developed policies on transparency, 
and Islamic Relief and other humanitarian agencies 
have developed complaints procedures for project 
communities. Meanwhile, Oxfam International and Save 
the Children have scaled up participatory practices and 
are involving key external stakeholders in organisational 
governance, and a number of organisations such as 
World Vision International have appointed staff specifically 
to lead on issues of internal accountability  
and transparency.
Similar dynamics have been at play amongst the newer 
breed of INGOs involved in standards-setting. In the late 
2000s for example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN)4 and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) developed 
accountability and transparency guidelines.5 At the same 
time, the ISEAL Alliance, a coalition of organisations 
involved in social and environmental standards-setting 
developed a Code of Good Practice, which identified 
principles of transparency and stakeholder engagement 
as crucial to sustaining their legitimacy as global actors.6 
In addition to organisation-specific moves, there have 
also been further developments within and concerning 
the INGO sector more broadly, partly driven by the 
fragmented and, at times, coercive or inappropriate nature 
of national regulation, as well as the lack of international 
frameworks governing global organisations’ activities. Civil 
society self-regulation initiatives have emerged across 
sectors since the 1980s, with a major push resulting from 
the international failure to respond adequately to the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda.7 In particular, over the past decade 
we have seen an expansion of NGO self-regulation into 
new thematic areas well beyond the humanitarian and 
development sectors. In 2003, the Code of Good Practice 
for NGOs Responding to HIV/AIDS was developed by  
11 global INGOs involved in tackling HIV. The consultative 
process through which the code was developed resulted 
in over 160 organisations signing on by the time of 
its launch.8 In 2006, 16 international advocacy NGOs 
developed the INGO Accountability Charter, which 
commits member organisations to principles such as 
transparency, accountability and responsible lobbying. 
Most recently, in 2007, the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership International (HAP) began certifying NGOs 
against its Standards in Accountability and Quality 
Management, and has gone through a participatory 
review of its framework with its members. In connection 
to the INGO Charter, an international working group 
2.0 Accountability: global trends and challenges ahead
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convened by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
developed a reporting framework for signatories, intended 
to support them in reporting against the charter. In 
addition, fundraising and auditing or monitoring bodies 
increasingly coordinate internationally, such as through 
the International Committee on Fundraising Organisations 
(ICFO) or the International Organisation of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). These initiatives, either 
implemented by the membership of the initiative or a 
3rd party, complement the approach taken by the One 
World Trust Global Accountability Report and Framework 
at a global level, and are further supported by hundreds 
of national or regional self-regulation initiatives.9 There is 
thus a growing process underway to define accountability 
and effectiveness standards for civil society organisations, 
driven to a significant extent by a commitment and 
interest of the sector to improve itself and find appropriate 
solutions.
2.3 Trends in the intergovernmental sector
An increasing number of mechanisms have also 
emerged in the IGO sector since the 1980s, designed 
to open up organisations to outside scrutiny, involve 
civil society in policy discussion, and enable citizens and 
communities to raise issues of concern. Transparency 
policies have become commonplace since the World 
Bank first adopted its Information Disclosure Policy in 
1994. Complaints procedures have also become more 
widespread with all the Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) now having mechanisms for project-affected 
communities to seek redress. Concerns around internal 
corruption and fraud have led to the strengthening of 
internal audit functions and the development of whistle-
blower protection policies. There has also been greater 
focus on measuring impact and results with a number of 
agencies establishing independent evaluation offices, and 
rolling out results-based management systems.
In comparison to the more enthusiastic and formal uptake 
of self-regulation among NGOs, its use in IGOs has been 
less widespread, and exercised mainly through informal 
peer networks. For example, among MDBs, staff involved 
in civil society engagement or complaints procedures 
for project-affected communities meet on a regular 
basis to share information, good practice and learning. 
Among UN agencies, a similar group exists among 
evaluation professionals. An informal network established 
in 1984 evolved into the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) in 
2004. The UNEG subsequently developed a document 
which set common standards in evaluation practice.10 
Prominently, many bilateral donors and intergovernmental 
agencies have engaged with the aid effectiveness debate 
through the 2005 Paris Declaration, discussed below.
Yet there are also important bottlenecks and setbacks 
at the level of IGOs, and in particular, in relation to 
international and regional financial institutions. Reform 
of key aspects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
governance is only moving slowly. There is still no 
agreement on the basic parameters of a voting shift of 
at least 5 per cent to emerging market and developing 
economies, which was endorsed by G20 leaders.11 
Moreover, the re-composition of the IMF Executive Board 
in support of a more balanced voice of the membership is 
stalling because of the European countries’ reluctance to 
consolidate their seats. 
The World Bank governance reform process has 
produced a few tangible gains. In 2010, it passed a 
new information disclosure policy, which has been 
recognised for its progressive nature by civil society 
and experts alike, and some observers have said that 
it could lead to a “new era of openness” at the Bank.12 
Several MDBs are following the World Bank’s lead. The 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a new 
Access to Information Policy that was based on the World 
Bank’s policy. In an effort to bolster its case for capital 
replenishment, the IDB Governors, pressed primarily by 
the United States, requested rapid action at a meeting 
in Cancun in April, and also advocated that the new 
policy should match that of other international financial 
institutions.13
Yet changes such as this must not remain 
unaccompanied, as only reform on different dimensions 
of accountability are likely to produce mutually reinforcing 
effects. The latest round of reforms means that high-
income countries still have over 60 per cent of voting 
11
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power, middle-income countries around one-third, and 
low-income countries just 6 per cent.14  No further reform 
will take place for five years. There are plans to develop 
a formula to calculate voting shares in the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, part 
of the World Bank Group) and International Development 
Assistance (IDA, part of the World Bank Group), which 
would take into account countries’ economic weight, 
donations to IDA, and contributions to the Bank’s 
‘development mission’. However, the latest reforms 
placed a heavy emphasis on economic weight (75 per 
cent), followed by countries’ contributions to IDA (20 per 
cent) – both criteria which favour high-income countries. 
The development element was accorded just 5 per 
cent, and was also partly defined by IDA contributions. 
Important imbalances thus persist which cannot be 
balanced by progress on transparency issues alone.
2.4 Developments in the corporate world
Accountability has also moved onto the corporate 
agenda. The 1980s witnessed the development of 
many corporate environmental codes of conduct in 
response to both increased regulation and public 
pressures in the wake of industrial disasters. During the 
1990s, globalisation and NGO activism added labour 
and social development concerns to the agenda. Multi-
stakeholder initiatives such as the Forestry Stewardship 
Council and the Ethical Trading Initiative emerged to 
address social and environmental concerns through 
partnership between corporations, NGOs and IGOs. 
Simultaneously, increasing numbers of companies started 
reporting on their environmental and social impact, and 
engaging stakeholders in a more systematic way. The 
term ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) came to the 
forefront, increasingly supported by voluntary codes of 
conduct and other self-regulation tools. An early peer 
level example is the European Chemical Industry Council, 
which developed the Responsible Care Programme 
and reporting guidelines in 1985. By the early 1990s, 
companies had begun to seek external certification 
through initiatives such as Social Accountability 
International (1997). Over the past decade, corporations 
have focused on participation in and development of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. These include the Ethical 
Trading Initiative (1998) to address supply chain labour 
issues, the UN Global Compact (2000), the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (2002) and the Equator 
Principles (2003) for responsible project finance, and the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which today has over 
1,500 companies using its reporting framework to publicly 
report on their social and environmental impact. 
Yet the global economic crisis has exposed the gaping 
holes in an approach to shaping corporate behaviour 
through CSR and self-regulation alone. Ensuring 
accountability is not about developing high visibility-
promoting compensatory activities, however valuable 
they are in themselves, but about preventing systemic 
failures and external harm in the first place. Transparency 
and creating a better understanding of the nature of 
the impact of corporate transactions, especially in the 
financial services sector, has driven the emergence of 
new institutions such as the Financial Stability Board. 
Existing ones such as Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which has its secretariat in the Bank for 
International Settlements, are issuing new regulations 
such as Basel III. It is crucial for both their legitimacy 
and ultimately effectiveness that these receive, and 
should open themselves up to, the input and influence of 
ordinary citizens across the world who are most affected 
by economic turmoil, but have very limited control 
opportunities concerning the system itself. 
However, changes have not been limited to the financial 
services sector, despite its great prominence. The EITI 
(Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) launched in 
2002 is gaining widespread support from governments, 
forcing more companies based in their countries to abide 
by its standards. Legislation in the US introduced by the 
Wall Street Reform Act (WRSA) now requires companies 
listed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to report on almost every payment made to 
foreign governments to develop natural resources. The 
bill specifies that payments should be listed project by 
project.15 It could potentially encourage major US oil firms, 
which will soon be subject to disaggregated reporting 
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worldwide as a result of the WSRA, to argue for the same 
reporting burden for all companies.16
2.5 Cross-sector and integrating initiatives
In addition to these above trends, which are mainly 
confined to individual sectors, there are also a number 
of integrating initiatives which highlight the resurgence 
of national governments as actors in global governance. 
Interestingly, this points towards a greater flexibility and 
more purpose-bound attitude to forming alliances, which 
may go beyond a stiffly structured governance model for 
global affairs.
A case in point is the shift from the G8 to the G20 
precipitated by the world financial crisis. While some may 
express concern that the G20, as a self-appointed club of 
countries, continues to lack legitimacy, it is a step in the 
right direction. However, while the first three G20 summits 
will be remembered for the group’s strong commitment to 
advancing multilateralism and coordinated global action in 
response to the crisis, follow up in terms of practical steps 
has been less visible. Eventually the success of the G20 
will hinge on the ability of its members, individually and 
collectively, to be inclusive beyond their limited group and 
work with more legitimate and accountable multilateral 
institutions.17
15
 http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?contentid=7084 
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 There is still wide uncertainty about the scope of interpretation of the WSRA. The SEC had until March 2011 to publish executive regulations, and the 
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17
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In another field, the initially donor-led debate about 
accountability and effectiveness has proved to be of 
particular importance to NGOs as well. Today, the OECD-
coordinated 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
which details donor commitments to ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, management for results and 
mutual accountability in the delivery of aid, has major 
support not just amongst bi- and multilateral donors, 
but also amongst non-state donors. Preceded by the 
first High Level Forum in Rome in 2003, and followed 
by the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 and the Fourth 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, 
this body of work has led, amongst other results, to the 
cross-sector IATI (International Aid Transparency Initiative), 
launched in 2008. 
13
Challenges for the future
Irrespective of sector, global organisations are thus 
recognising that legitimacy and effectiveness are tied to 
their individual and collective ability to show to whom, 
for what and how they are accountable. Of course 
the depth with which organisations engage with these 
issues varies considerably. Some organisations are 
more committed than others, but the initial argument for 
strengthened accountability has clearly been won and 
global organisations across the spectrum are responding 
positively, if not necessarily proactively.
Yet, despite a lot of important progress, there remain a 
range of challenges. These are partly conceptual, and 
partly operational in terms of making organisational 
reform work. From our engagement with many global 
organisations across sectors, work with the Global 
Accountability Framework, the cycle of reporting 
from 2006 to 2008, and the analysis of trends and 
developments in the accountability reform debate, we 
have identified a number of key challenges that the 
accountability community will need to continue to  
work on.
3.1 Aligning accountability capabilities 
with practice
Technical accountability reforms play a crucial role in 
realising accountability. For example, public consultations 
create spaces for stakeholders to question organisations, 
and complaints mechanisms can be used to challenge 
decisions. However, introducing such systems also 
involves burdens, especially if coupled with the build-up 
of internal reporting systems to monitor accountability 
performance. Depending on the size and capacity of an 
organisation, too much accountability pressure pervading 
an organisation’s work and processes can prevent 
progress on priority issues, stifle innovation and create 
unnecessary bureaucracy. Especially at the beginning of 
reform processes, organisations struggle with the need 
to address many different issues at the same time, and 
stakeholders and accountability reviewers need to accept 
that not all desirable changes can be implemented at 
once. The important element is for organisations to make 
their choices in a conscious, informed and participatory 
way, and be prepared to argue their case for the chosen 
course of action publicly.
In addition to equipping the organisation with the 
necessary policies and support systems, there is the 
challenge of how to deal with the inevitable gaps between 
accountability frameworks and practices, and gradually 
align them. In several cases for instance, external 
observers have pointed out where particular organisations 
that have scored well in previous Global Accountability 
Reports, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the World Bank-IBRD and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), have in practice, on more than 
one occasion, ignored stated procedures, violated their 
own information disclosure policies, and failed to take 
remedial action on legitimate complaints. 
Our research has shown that key to overcoming 
such gaps between policy and practice is embedding 
accountability into the culture of an organisation. 
Accountability reform can occur within two 
interconnected but distinct areas– accountability 
capabilities and accountability culture. Accountability 
capabilities refer to the institutional structure of 
accountability– procedures, mechanisms, and processes, 
such as a transparency policy or a complaints 
mechanism. Accountability culture refers to the attitudes 
and behaviours of staff, such as their perceptions of 
external stakeholders and how they interact with them. 
Reform in both areas is essential (se Figure 1 overleaf). 
Without formal procedures, accountability would be 
largely expressed through ad hoc and informal practices. 
It would therefore lack consistency and coherence across 
an organisation. At the same time, without a supportive 
organisational culture, mechanisms and procedures of 
accountability such as stakeholder forums or civil society 
consultations tend to amount to little more than window 
dressing. 
Yet to date, and partly encouraged by frameworks 
such as the One World Trust’s, the energies of most 
global organisations have mainly been directed toward 
3.0 Challenges for the future
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establishing accountability capabilities. There has been 
far less engagement with deeper issues of creating an 
accountability culture, i.e. creating an environment of 
incentives and frameworks that encourages staff to live up 
to the policies of the organisations as part of their attitude. 
To address these issues, the new Global Accountability 
Framework is strengthening its focus both on the 
leadership and strategic view an organisation takes 
on its commitments to accountability, and on the 
support provided to effectively monitoring accountability 
performance through quality management systems that 
can identify where an organisation’s practice diverges 
from its commitments.
3.2 The politics of accountability reform
A major challenge for the future is to achieve political as 
well as technical accountability reform across sectors. 
All accountability reforms tend to upset established 
ways of working and can generate conflict within an 
organisation. However, some changes generate more 
resistance than others. Technical accountability reforms, 
such as the development of whistle-blower policies or 
the establishment of advisory panels, may generate initial 
resistance, but internal support and momentum can 
quickly be built for such administrative reforms. Political 
reforms – those that strike at the heart of power and 
decision-making structures – are often more intractable, 
a point illustrated by the difficulties faced by the IMF 
and World Bank to changing their voting quotas, or the 
challenges faced by many INGOs to changing inequitable 
governance structures that privilege Northern over 
Southern members through financial discrimination. In 
the International Save the Children Alliance, for example, 
members that contribute five per cent or more of the 
aggregate total membership contributions get automatic 
representation on the Alliance Board; in both Greenpeace 
International (in relation to global expenditure) and Plan 
International, voting rights are based on (the highly 
skewed) members’ financial contributions to international 
expenditure; and in World Vision International, the US 
and Canada each have two seats on the International 
Figure 1: Accountability capabilities, practices and culture
Accountability 
Capabilities
Structures, mechanisms, 
policies and systems of 
accountability
Accountability 
Culture
Attitudes, values and 
beliefs of staff that 
support accountable 
behaviour
Accountability 
Practices
Activities and interactions 
between an organisation 
and its stakeholders
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Board, while remaining members are represented through 
regional forums. However, some progress has been 
made, for instance, by Amnesty International which, while 
not abolishing the higher voting power of large sections 
at its International Council Meeting, has introduced a new 
representation opportunity for individual members outside 
the nationals sections and structures. 
Related challenges confront global organisation such as 
ICANN, where accountability reforms have increased 
openness and transparency relatively swiftly, but reforms 
related to board composition and internet user 
representation on the board have been more controversial 
and progressed more slowly. Realising accountability 
therefore, requires change in power relations within an 
organisation. 
Unless global organisations are willing to engage with the 
more complex political issues of power and its distribution, 
their legitimacy will continue to be questioned. The Global 
Accountability Report continues to add value here as it is 
unique in showing such challenges across sectors and 
from a global level perspective. 
3.3 Ensuring discourse, purpose and 
tools match
It needs to be understood clearly whom and what 
purpose the adopted approach to accountability is 
supposed to serve. In particular, the current economic 
crisis and squeeze on funding have seen a resurgence of 
interpretations of accountability that reinforce control of 
financial flows and delivery from the end of funding 
bodies. The result is that there are often significant 
inconsistencies between the headline commitments made 
by an organisation to stakeholder-oriented accountability 
– which put those whom the organisation serves first and 
recognises the existence of, and need to, balance multiple 
relationships – and the de facto ways relationships are 
structured and supported with instruments such as 
contracts – which give preference to the bilateral 
relationship between donor and implementing agency. It is 
here that power is frequently exercised and vertical, narrow 
principal-agent types of accountability relationships are 
enforced. This often happens very much under the radar 
of external observers and to some degree, even of senior 
managers in organisations who do not sufficiently engage 
with the challenge of changing day-to-day management 
of accountability and the culture that it transports. 
The Global Accountability Framework and Report can 
help to unearth these problematic contradictions by 
disaggregating the analysis of performance with regards 
to policy and management systems and quality control.
3.4 Appropriate evaluation approaches
In particular, the evaluation community continues to 
struggle with finding harmonised approaches to evaluating 
results that allow a comparative review of performance 
and impact in relation to investment and interventions, 
while ensuring that the evaluation criteria and methods 
are appropriate for the subject matter at hand. While 
most of this discussion relates to the search for ways 
to understand and measure substantive impact, it is 
also relevant to the field of evaluating accountability 
performance: organisations will face different types 
of challenges when seeking to understand whether 
their accountability has indeed improved with certain 
stakeholder groups, and what external parameters 
and variables play into measuring the effectiveness of 
accountability reforms. A one-size-fits-all approach to 
reviewing performance is difficult to envisage.
The Global Accountability Framework recognises these 
necessary differences and uses sector-specific indicators 
in the evaluation dimension. In addition, it requires the 
evaluation results to be linked to organisational learning 
systems, hence providing an incentive to conduct 
meaningful evaluations rather than produce data that is 
not relevant to performance improvement.
3.5 Realism in making use of self-regulation
Self-regulation remains both a field of great potential and 
of unsure impact. The overview of trends in section 2 
above shows that the various self-regulation initiatives that 
are being used at different levels sit along a continuum- 
from informal peer groups that share learning and 
practice, to codes of principles, more detailed conducts 
of conduct, formal certification and third party verification. 
Which approach is taken often reflects the level of debate 
on accountability in a particular sector. Certification, 
for example, tends to emerge only when debate and 
discussion on accountability has matured to the point 
of clear understanding and agreement on common 
standards against which organisations are willing to be 
assessed. Because of the often very precise nature of 
formulation of standards, they may only lend themselves 
to application in their primary field of concern or sector 
of origin, and the strong control frequently exercised by 
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members over certification standards may also weaken 
their analytical quality. However, this downside is often 
compensated by the buy-in they have from users.
This also shows where some of the other problems are. 
By definition voluntary organisations are free to decide 
whether or not they abide by the standards or principles 
of a self-regulation initiative. This limits the impact self-
regulation can have on a sector, and therefore also 
limits its reach as an accountability tool. Incentives 
need to be created to encourage organisations to 
participate, including a demonstrated ability to shape 
organisational behaviour, performance and recognition, 
as the value added by being part of the club. Perhaps 
more problematic, however, is the fact that most self-
regulatory initiatives frequently lack effective compliance 
and enforcement mechanisms. Once a member of an 
initiative, it is often left to the organisation to ensure that 
the principles are followed, and to what extent it reports 
publicly rests on compliance. This lack of enforcement 
is problematic as it can sometimes lead to free riding, 
eventually degrading the value of the initiative for all  
other participants. 
The Global Accountability Framework speaks to the 
challenges and opportunities offered by self-regulation 
by actively encouraging the engagement of organisations 
with external accountability initiatives, and seeks to  
make use of the data generated by the most recognised 
and reliable self-regulation initiatives for the scoring 
process itself.
17
The review of the Global Accountability Framework
First published in 2005 in its full version, the Global 
Accountability Framework supported the first cycle of the 
Global Accountability Report from 2006-2008, assessing 
more than 90 global organisations in all. Over this period 
we have gained significant insight into how to develop 
a methodology and ensure the integrity of our results. 
However, we have also learnt a lot about the challenges 
to measuring accountability in the face of diverse 
organisational structures and ways of working. To ensure 
that the Global Accountability Report remains a relevant 
and critical tool for strengthening the accountability of 
global organisations, we set out in 2009 to review the 
methodology and indicators. 
4.1 The consultation process 
The consultation process ran between October 2009 and 
October 2010, and was delivered in seven main stages: 
1 The views of One World Trust staff who have been 
involved in the Global Accountability Report process 
were gathered alongside the feedback we had 
received from assessed organisations and partners 
over the past three years. This helped identify the key 
questions around which to structure the consultation. 
2 A total of 58 participants attended three main 
workshops in Geneva, London and Washington, 
to which all of the organisations that have been 
assessed through the Global Accountability Report 
were invited in addition to key external stakeholders 
and experts.
3 An online survey was sent to all of the 90 assessed 
organisations that have been involved in the Global 
Accountability Report assessment process. The 
survey ran between November and December 2009. 
4 We also solicited feedback via the survey from 
over 100 additional stakeholders, experts and 
representatives of other quality and accountability 
initiatives. Many of these had been involved in the 
Global Accountability Report assessment process 
in the past. Across both survey parts we had a 
response rate of 51% and over 100 replies. 
5 One World Trust staff and associates conducted a 
review of major trends in global governance in terms 
of substantive themes, but also on emerging actors 
and related accountability debates, in order to identify 
new challenges on the horizon to which a framework 
would need to be able to respond. 
6 Based on this, the team drafted a pilot framework 
which was presented for discussion and input to 
key members of the One World Trust International 
Advisory Board and the Board of Trustees, to draw 
on the specific expertise existing at this level. The 
draft framework was then published in May 2011.
7 Finally, during 2011, the draft framework was used 
and tested in real life with a small sample of global 
organisations as part of a wider research project. The 
experiences helped to hone some of the wording of 
the draft framework, and develop further guidance for 
researchers involved. The resulting final framework is 
presented here.
4.2 What we heard: a summary of 
feedback received 
The following section provides a summary of the feedback 
we received from stakeholders during the consultation. 
4.2.1 Benefits
A strong theme to emerge from the consultation was 
that the Global Accountability Report has provided 
a useful conceptual framework to organisations for 
operationalising accountability. Accountability is a word 
that is frequently used, but rarely defined. The Global 
Accountability Report has helped to define what it 
means to be accountable, and made the concept 
more relevant to organisations. This was expressed 
for instance by contributors saying: “The Global 
Accountability Report has provided an easy to understand 
framework for both process oriented (transparency and 
participation) and evaluation focused (evaluation, feedback 
and complaints) accountability measures. It supports a 
proactive stance towards accountability”, or “It’s made 
organisations think about what accountability means 
and provided a framework that organisations can use 
4.0 The review of the Global Accountability Framework
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as a reference point when looking to strengthen their 
accountability. There’s probably no other area where 
organisations can be objectively compared, particularly 
non-profits where we don’t even have a bottom line”.
For some, the Global Accountability Report has 
also helped to broaden organisations’ view of 
accountability beyond traditional concepts such 
as evaluation and financial management: “The Global 
Accountability Report helped broaden the scope of 
accountability discussions within the organisation beyond 
what had initially been planned”.
As well as providing a firm conceptual basis for how to 
strengthen accountability, the Global Accountability 
Report has also provided a useful diagnostic tool 
that has helped organisations identify strengths and 
weaknesses: “It contributed to us taking a better look at 
ourselves and then addressing the areas where we were 
found lacking. The challenge is to keep this conversation 
and discussion going once the tools are in place so as to 
make it a ‘live’ and everyday issue”.
Stakeholder feedback suggested that the Global 
Accountability Report has also helped to raise the 
profile of the accountability agenda by creating intra-
organisational linkages. One common remark from 
assessed organisations was that the Global Accountability 
Report assessment process brought together parts of an 
organisation that rarely interact (e.g. human resources, 
ethics office, communications, programmes), and helped 
lay the foundations for ongoing dialogue between different 
functions and departments on accountability. 
As well as raising awareness of accountability, some 
stakeholders felt the Global Accountability Report has 
helped create incentives for change. Respondents 
distinguished a number of diverse ways in which the 
Report has done this. Firstly, by showcasing the efforts of 
organisations to improve their accountability the Global 
Accountability Report has helped create a ‘positive 
environment’ within institutions towards further 
reform: “The Global Accountability Report has raised 
awareness and generated debate within [our organisation] 
on accountability and created a positive atmosphere for 
further steps forward”. 
Secondly, by publicly highlighting where an organisation 
is doing well, but also revealing weaknesses and gaps, 
the Global Accountability Report has supported 
internal change agents in making the case for further 
improvements: “Being recognised externally is certainly 
useful support for those inside organisations who are 
arguing for greater transparency”. 
Third, rating organisations publicly has also created 
momentum for change. Organisations that do well 
want to retain their good score, while those that do less 
well want to improve: “Doing bad in a rating hurts and it 
provided a clear incentive to improve our accountability”. 
Furthermore, a public rating puts information into 
the public domain that can be used by external 
actors to advocate for greater change: “Since 
it relies on a transparent set of criteria [the Global 
Accountability Report] has the potential to make the global 
players’ strengths and weaknesses visible. This way it 
provides background information to civil society which 
mostly cannot be found by screening the web site of 
organisations and companies”.
The ability to compare accountability across peers 
both within and outside one’s sector was seen as 
particularly useful contribution of the Global Accountability 
Report by a majority of contributors: “The Global 
Accountability Report has pioneered the cross-sectoral 
assessment on accountability, provides a very useful 
frame of reference for benchmarking accountability, 
and on an overarching level, has made a strong case 
for applying the same accountability standards to 
international state and well as non-state standard setters 
and policy makers”. 
In taking a cross-sector approach to accountability, 
another contribution the Global Accountability Report 
was seen to make was the promotion of greater 
cooperation and learning between organisations 
both within and across the three sectors. A frequent 
comment was that the Global Accountability Report 
has helped provide and promote a common language 
for organisations to discuss accountability: “I think 
having a set of common elements means we are 
beginning to speak the same language and that we all 
begin to see the interconnectedness of what we do and 
how we do it”.
Finally, a thread emerged during the consultation that 
focused on the value that the cross-sector assessment 
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of accountability of global organisations added to the 
debate on the delivery of global public goods. Going 
back to some of the original motivations behind the 
Charter 99 for Global Democracy, which kicked off 
the quest for common principles of accountability, one 
participant summed up: “Global Governance serves a 
purpose: ensuring a sustainable and better world with 
more opportunities for people to enjoy human rights, and 
prosper. The Global Accountability Framework and Report 
should continue testing organisation’s commitment to 
citizens and their well-being through effectiveness in what 
they do in a social context”. 
4.2.2	 Challenges
While many of those consulted saw the process of 
assessing organisations across and within sectors as a 
strength of the Global Accountability Report, there was, 
however, also concern that using a common lens 
through which to view all actors meant important 
differences between actors and their approaches to 
accountability were not captured: “You need to reflect 
the different sectoral and hence organisational rationales 
which impact on accountability structures”, “The Global 
Accountability Report needs to take effective account of 
sector differences and develop measures appropriate to 
those differences”, or “Different types of organisations […] 
have different type of obligations towards stakeholders 
due to their nature”.
Another concern raised by stakeholders was that the 
current indicator framework is biased towards 
organisational structures where decision-making 
power and policy are centralised: “The review focused 
at headquarter level favours a view that accountability can 
best be realised in hierarchical organisations”. 
Many organisations noted that a reassessment would 
be beneficial as it would push organisations to act 
on recommendations, and where these have already 
been implemented, a reassessment would provide 
an opportunity to showcase the reforms. However, 
stakeholders also asked the question what benefit the 
Global Accountability Report would provide after an 
initial reassessment, and suggested that each round of 
assessment needs to offer something new that continually 
challenges organisations to do better.
Another point that was raised by a number of 
stakeholders, particularly those from the NGO and 
corporate sectors, is that the Global Accountability 
Report needs to link in better with other 
accountability, quality and reporting initiatives as 
global organisations across the three sectors face  
growing requests for information from a number of 
initiatives. Many organisations see the value of these 
different initiatives, but are understandably wary of 
engaging with them all because of the resource this 
demands. Establishing correspondence between 
standards could be a way forward. 
A further strong theme to emerge from the consultation 
was the need for the Global Accountability Report 
to expand its assessment beyond capabilities – 
policies and systems – to also encompass how an 
organisation practices accountability: “[The Global 
Accountability Report] focuses on accessible material 
via the web site or through agencies that engage and 
provide the material (e.g. policies and guidelines). This 
really only gives a certain perspective and does not take 
into account staff awareness and application, practice as 
viewed and experienced by clients, affected communities 
and other stakeholders. It can therefore give a false sense 
of security”.
The practice case studies featured in the Report since 
2007 have been recognised as a useful contribution 
here. An organisation for example, may score well for its 
transparency capabilities and place quite high in relation 
to peers, but a case study might indicate that there are 
a number of instances where practices fail to live up to 
policy. However, the case studies were seen as 
having less influence on organisations than the 
ranking index itself. 
A first reason given was that because case studies sit 
separate from the quantitative assessment and therefore 
have no bearing over the final score, they could easily 
be overlooked because people mainly focus on the 
score in the Report. Second, it was noted that case 
studies, while effective for revealing the complexities of 
accountability, are a less effective tool for catching 
the attention of senior managers. As one London 
workshop participant noted: “A bad score in relation to 
peers is what forces a busy senior manager to take note 
of Global Accountability Report, not a detailed case study. 
Case studies are useful, but they are a tool for technical 
audience, rather than galvanising action among key 
decision-makers”. 
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Finally, we received comments which pointed to the 
widening nature of organisations engaged in global 
policy making and affecting people’s lives, and the 
challenges with reviewing these: “Currently the framework 
indicators allow the assessment of organisations that 
share one common feature: they all have members of 
some sort or the other. But what about government 
departments (such as bilateral donors), rich individuals 
and foundations, privately or state-owned companies, or 
private-public partnerships? They should receive similar 
scrutiny for their impact and accountability”. 
4.2.3 Maximising the cross-sector learning function
In addition to a range of different propositions put forward 
for actual revision of the framework, which are taken up 
in section 5 below, the consultation yielded a number of 
comments and recommendations that are not possible 
to directly translate into revised indicators, but highlight a 
particular value that users and stakeholders of the report 
would like to see being developed: the cross-sector 
learning function.
Participants suggested, for instance: “I am a great fan 
of the Global Accountability Report and feel that it is 
breaking new ground. Perhaps OWT could set up a 
community of practice among representatives of all three 
sectors (responsible for accountability at their respective 
institutions) to further the dialogue, develop a common 
language, and collaborate on the issue of accountability. 
This could not only help to further the ‘state of art’ in 
this field, but help to build trust and bring these sectors 
closer together”, or “A learning forum on accountability 
could provide a space for organisations from across the 
sectors to come together to discuss their experiences 
in strengthening accountability, encourage mutual 
learning and develop collaborative tools for improving 
accountability”. 
Evidently contributors were convinced that over and 
above the Report itself, other means could be developed 
that maximised the impact of its findings for organisational 
reform: “A report is not the only way to share, support 
and advance the issue of accountability […] discussing 
in a safe space as opposed to having shortcomings and 
failures in the public domain would be more effective”, 
and “A core objective of the Global Accountability Report 
is to strengthen cross-sector learning and dialogue on 
accountability. Up until now the primary means through 
which we have realised this is through the Report and ad 
hoc events and workshops where representatives of the 
different sectors have come together. Moving forward, 
the development of a formal community of practice could 
bring greater structure to this process and generate more 
strategic discussions on issue of most relevance. Comes 
with challenges however”. 
Concrete suggestions to take this further thus comprise of 
the setting up of a learning forum, possibly in the form 
of a protected space where organisations can meet 
and discuss common challenges safely. In addition, 
the problem of assessing practice was woven into these 
discussions, prompting suggestions of a safe community 
of practice as a place where self-assessment results 
could be first discussed in confidence: “It is probably 
not feasible to assess practice from the outside; it 
may be better to think of communities of practice of 
committed/interested orgs who are willing to look deeper 
into the above factors [how an organisation practices 
accountability] through self-assessment”, or “You should 
look at creating a space where organisations can discuss 
their challenges, and develop tools for self-assessment”.
4.2.4 Summary
The feedback was thus overall very positive in terms of 
the value the Global Accountability Report adds to the 
accountability debate, conceptual thinking, individual 
organisational reform and learning, as well as to 
empowering stakeholders to hold global organisations 
to account. However, there remain some obvious and 
important challenges, such as how to: 
• strike a balance between the requirements of a 
high level comparative framework, and the need to 
recognise sectoral and organisational specificities, 
• achieve openness to innovative and varying 
organisational structure and typology, 
• remain a constructive vector for change in the way 
information is presented,
• address the difficult issue of gaps between 
capabilities and practice in organisational 
accountability performance, 
• ensure that the framework can be used for all 
relevant types of organisations involved in the delivery 
of global public goods and/or have major impact on 
people’s lives, and
• create (and fund!) the space for safe discussions on 
organisational reform, performance and results of 
self-assessment. This was articulated as a real need.
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Based on the feedback we received through the 
consultation, and following further research and 
consideration of options, the team developed a 
new framework which, while building on the existing 
methodology and indicator frameworks, also charts 
new territory. In its reformulated version, the framework 
aims not only to keep track of the progress made by 
many organisations, but to stay ahead of the curve 
and test organisations against currently existing good 
practice. Ongoing cycles of implementation, reflection, 
and revisions will therefore need to be a staple feature of 
Global Accountability Report in the future also. The follow 
section outlines the most important changes that have 
been made and explains the reasoning behind them. 
5.1 Providing a more accurate and 
transparent assessment: a scaled 
scoring system
Over the past three years of conducting Global 
Accountability Report, we have found that a binary  
system of scoring indicators (yes or no, present or  
absent) failed in some cases to provide the flexibility 
needed to accurately assess organisations’ accountability. 
For example, an organisation may not have a formal 
policy on transparency, but transparency might be a core 
organisational value. A commitment to transparency may 
run throughout organisational processes and procedures, 
and credit should be given for this. 
To address the inflexibility of the previous method we have 
moved towards a scaled scoring system. Using a scale 
from 0 to 3, we describe four levels for each indicator, 
where each level represents progressively stronger 
accountability capabilities (see Table 1: Example of the 
new graded scoring system). This will enable a more 
nuanced analysis of an organisation’s accountability and in 
turn enhance the accuracy of the assessment. 
The scaled scoring system will bring two additional 
benefits. First, it will facilitate greater consistency in how 
the scoring is undertaken by One World Trust researchers. 
Having a detailed description of what needs to exist for 
each point along the scoring scale will help researchers 
in deciding on how to score an organisation, and also 
make the reasoning behind a score more transparent to 
the assessed organisations. Second, the scaled scoring 
system will provide organisations with greater scope 
for implementing gradual improvements. For example, 
whereas with the binary system an organisation without a 
transparency policy would need to develop one in order to 
score, with the scaled scoring system, we can recognises 
and give credit to intermediary steps.
5.0 Key changes – raising the bar and meeting 
emerging challenges
Table 1: Example of the new graded scoring system 
Indicator              Description Score 
The organisation has 
a specific policy that 
guides its disclosure  
of information
The	organisation	has	no	transparency	policy	and/or	makes	only	a	vague	commitment	to	be	open	and	
transparent.
0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	transparency	in	core	organisational	documents	(e.g.	Code	of	Conduct,	
mission,	vision,	values)	but	does	not	have	a	specific	document	guiding	the	disclosure	of	information
1
The	organisation	has	a	specific	policy	to	guide	information	disclosure	that	is	mandatory,	but	it	only	applies	to	
some	activities	and	operations	(e.g.	financial	information,	or	media	communications)	and	does	not	provide	clarity	
about	what	and	when	information	will	be	made	public.	
2
The	organisation	has	a	transparency	policy	that	is	mandatory	(passed	by	board)	and	applies	across	all	activities	
and	operations;	it	provides	clear	guidance	around	what	and	when	information	is	made	public;	and	it	is	supported	
by	implementation	guidelines	which	help	staff	implement	and	interpret	its	provisions.
3
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5.2 Quality management: systems for 
monitoring practice 
Assessing how an organisation practices accountability 
is an issue we have grappled with since the inception 
of the Global Accountability Report, repeatedly coming 
up against a number of challenges. Our approach to 
date has been to develop practice case studies that sit 
alongside the scoring of capabilities. The shortcomings of 
this approach have been recognised, but the challenge is 
to build a better system. 
The unit of assessment for the Global Accountability 
Report is a global organisation, which by definition 
has operations in numerous, sometimes more than a 
hundred countries. While it is possible to use a robust 
sampling methodology to ensure representativeness of 
results, for those organisations that have thousands of 
projects in hundreds of countries, even with a narrow 
sample size the total number of investigations to carry out 
would be too large to replicate across 90 organisations 
in a cost-effective and, above all, empirically reliable 
way. Spot checks, by conducting assessments of one 
randomly chosen office or project per organisation for 
instance, would only allow a judgement to be made on 
how an organisation is practicing accountability in one 
location or instance. A further option considered included 
drawing data from other sources, such as initiatives like 
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) that 
undertake assessments of practice. While these could 
provide data for use by Global Accountability Report, 
such initiatives only cover a handful of global organisations 
included in the Global Accountability Report, leaving the 
problem for the majority of organisations unresolved. 
Another possible option considered was to undertake 
a survey of stakeholders’ perceptions of accountability. 
Problematically, this type of information is by nature 
very different from the scoring of evidenced policies and 
management systems, and any amalgamated scores 
would be exposed to criticisms about the weighting of 
perception-based data and potential biases in how it 
had been gathered. This would put the integrity of the 
overall results at risk and limit their acceptance. Keeping 
the results of the survey separate from the overall 
accountability capabilities score is a possibility, but this still 
does not achieve the required integration of findings into 
one score. 
The above shows how difficult it is to achieve an 
empirically robust and reliable comparative assessment of 
accountability practice in global organisations. Following on 
from discussions of options with the workshop participants 
and further research, we concluded that rather than looking 
at the actual accountability practices of an organisation, 
the purpose would be best and most effectively served 
by assessing if an organisation has quality management 
systems in place for monitoring its own practices. 
For each dimension therefore, we have developed an 
indicator that assesses the systems an organisation has 
in place for managing how it implements accountability 
(see Table 2: Example for a quality management systems 
indicator). Higher scores are given to organisations that 
publicly disclose reports on how they are performing.
The underlying thought behind this approach, which 
was endorsed by the workshop participants and our 
Table 2: Example for a quality management systems indicator 
Indicator              Description Score 
Quality management 
system for 
transparency 
There	are	no	systems	in	place	to	monitor,	review	and	report	on	how	the	organisation	implements	its	
transparency	commitments,	or	more	broadly	handles	information	requests
0
No	organisation	wide	system	exists	to	monitoring	the	implementation	of	transparency	commitments,	but	there	is	
evidence	that	monitoring	takes	place	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	in	some	areas	of	operation
1
A	system	is	in	place	for	monitoring	commitments	to	transparency;	regular	reports	are	produced	which	includes	
number	of	information	requests	received	and	percentage	rejected	and	criteria	for	rejection;	these	reports	are	for	
internal	circulation	only
2
A	robust	system	is	in	place	for	monitoring	its	commitments	to	transparency;	regular	reports	are	produced	which	
includes	number	of	information	requests	received	and	percentage	rejected	and	criteria	for	rejection;	these	
reports	are	consistently	made	public
3
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international advisers, is that a quality management 
system can effectively be scored in terms of its ability 
to provide the organisation with relevant data, which 
in turn will allow to the organisation to ensure an 
increasing alignment of practice with policy. Especially 
when published, this data will also empower external 
stakeholders to hold the organisation to account over 
failures, and provide further incentives for improvement.
5.3 A new overarching dimension: 
accountability strategy 
The conceptual framework that underpins the Global 
Accountability Report divides accountability into four 
dimensions – transparency, participation, evaluation 
and complaints and response. When an organisation is 
assessed through the Report, it is scored in relation to 
each of these dimensions. 
While this provides an overall picture of an organisation’s 
capabilities in key areas of accountability, it does not 
distinguish between organisations that develop ad hoc 
response to their accountability and those that have set 
out a clear strategy to improve accountability across the 
organisation. For example, organisation X might develop 
a transparency policy because stakeholders demanded 
it and a complaints procedure for communities because 
peer agencies had one. Organisation Y on the other hand, 
may have started with questions about who they affect 
and who their stakeholders are, then identified which 
stakeholder are the most important, mapped out what 
mechanisms and practices support accountability to  
each of these, and identified key gaps. 
Thus, it put in place a transparency policy because it saw 
a need to ensure greater consistency in how it makes 
information available to the public – a key stakeholder for 
the continued legitimacy of its work – and it developed 
a complaints policy for communities because this 
stakeholder is at the heart of why the organisation exists, 
and currently has no means of holding the organisation  
to account. 
Having a clear strategy for strengthening accountability 
makes the difference between an organisation that 
is being accountable because external pressures are 
pushing it to be, and an organisation that is addressing its 
accountability because it sees it is key to the realisation 
of its mission and mandate. Reflecting this, we have 
included a new dimension into the Global Accountability 
Report called ‘accountability strategy’ which includes 
three key indicators:
Stakeholder mapping and prioritisation – does the 
organisation have a clear understanding of who its 
stakeholders are and which ones are priority? Is there 
evidence that this process has been informed by a 
systematic mapping? Has this been documented and  
is it being made publicly available?
Accountability mapping and action plan – does 
the organisation have a clear understanding of the 
mechanisms and processes it currently has in place for 
delivering accountability to each of its key stakeholder 
groups? Has this been informed by a systematic mapping 
process which has been documented? Based on this 
mapping, has a plan of action been developed that 
identifies how gaps will be plugged, has the plan been 
resourced, and is a plan for monitoring implementation  
in place?
Commitment to and awareness of existing external 
accountability commitments – does the organisation 
have a clear understanding of all of its external 
accountability commitments (e.g. the codes of conduct, 
principles and standards it is a member of/signatory 
to)? Are these listed in one place on its web site with 
information on the countries/operations where these 
apply for stakeholder to see? Are clear plans in place 
for monitoring and reporting on compliance with each 
of these commitment, and have specific people been 
assigned responsible for overseeing each initiative?
Most organisations irrespective of their sector are 
members/signatories to a number of self-regulatory 
initiatives such as codes of conduct/ethics or 
certification schemes. These represent its external 
accountability commitments. They are important tools 
for accountability as they help establish minimum 
standards of practice within a sector and provide a 
basis for holding organisations to account. However, 
for large multi-mandated global organisations, there 
are often a range of initiatives that different parts of the 
organisation are signatory to and there are not always 
systems for ensuring implementation of the standards. 
This new indicator is therefore testing if organisations a) 
have a comprehensive understanding of what they are 
committed to, and b) have the internal processes in place 
to ensure compliance. 
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5.4 Changing culture: rewarding and 
providing incentives for accountable 
behaviour
Accountability needs be integrated into the culture of an 
organisation. There is neither an easy way of doing this, 
nor a simple means of assessing the extent to which 
it is done. Incentivising and rewarding accountable 
practices among staff, however, is key. For example, staff 
should be rewarded for taking the time to engage with 
stakeholders before a decision. Similarly, an organisation 
that prioritises organisational learning should provide the 
space for staff to reflect, learn and reward the identification 
of mistakes and improvements. To capture the extent to 
which an organisation is trying to align staff behaviours 
with improving accountability, we have developed a new 
indicator that asks organisations to demonstrate how they 
are incentivising accountability among staff. 
5.5 Roles, responsibilities, and leadership 
on accountability
The Global Accountability Report has always recognised 
the importance of leadership in promoting accountability- 
unless the senior management of an organisation are 
behind the accountability agenda, reform will only ever 
be piecemeal. In the previous indicator framework, there 
was an indicator that asked if an organisation had senior 
managers that are responsible for each dimension of 
accountability. Our experience, however, has been that 
organisations may identify a senior manager that has 
responsibility, for transparency for example, but there is 
no clear understanding of how responsibilities will cascade 
down the organisation. In the revised indicator framework 
therefore, we now assess if roles and responsibilities are 
clearly mapped out at all levels of the organisation, from 
global to regional to national. 
5.6 Sector-specific indicators vs. the testing 
of cross-sector principles 
Some commentators have, with good reasons, called for 
the Global Accountability Report to be more responsive 
to sector and organisation-specific circumstances. At the 
same time one, if not the most, important contribution 
of the Report and Framework was the cross-sector 
comparative view. In response to the feedback we have 
therefore, where appropriate, developed indicators which 
speak to the specific accountability challenges and best 
practices of the three sectors, while maintaining the  
cross-sector perspective which should remain a key  
pillar of the framework. 
A quick view on the evaluation dimension may illustrate 
how we proceeded: for companies we focus on 
measuring and reporting social and environmental 
impact, while for IGOs and INGOs it is monitoring and 
evaluation of operations. This different emphasis is in part 
a reflection of the Global Accountability Report’s overall 
focus - how organisations impact upon society and how 
they manage this in a positive way (as a result we do not 
focus on companies’ performance management systems 
that relate to general product development) - and also 
in part a reflection of where current debate is in each 
sector. For companies, indicators focus on issues such 
as if performance measures have been developed to 
track the companies’ social and environmental impact, 
if these cover all material areas, and if the management 
systems in place for collecting, analysing and reporting 
performance have both internal and external assurance 
procedures to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the 
data. For IGOs we ask if an organisation has an evaluation 
unit, independent of management, that scrutinises the 
institution’s work. For INGOs (because to our knowledge 
no INGO has an evaluation unit which is entirely 
independent of management and it is more common to 
use independent evaluators), we ask organisations to 
demonstrate that procedures are in place to ensure that 
relevant evaluations are independent of the operations, 
policy and management of the activities that are being 
reviewed, and that the results of evaluations are reported 
to senior management. Similarly, for both INGOs and 
IGOs, we look to see if there is systematic process for 
management to follow up on evaluation recommendations 
(e.g. action plan and/or agreement clearly stating 
responsibilities) and oversee their implementation (e.g. 
periodic report on the status of implementation). 
These changes are important steps forward for the Global 
Accountability Report in developing contextual indicators 
which speak to the specific challenges and good practice 
of the three sectors, but which are informed by the same 
underlying principles of accountability. 
5.7 Engaging with the diversity of actors in 
global governance
One of the questions we were asked during the 
consultation was how a new framework would engage 
with actors involved in global governance that do not fall 
within the traditional typology of INGO, TNC, and IGO 
that the Global Accountability Report had used so far. 
The lists that were put together during the workshops 
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were extensive: multi-stakeholder initiatives, state-based 
companies, bilateral donors, hedge funds, public-private 
partnerships, public policy networks, research networks 
and many others. Many of these do not fit the ‘member-
owned’ model on which the 2005 framework was built.
In the 2005 framework the participation dimension of 
the Global Accountability Report was divided into two 
parts: one that assesses an organisation’s capabilities for 
engaging with external stakeholders, and the other, the 
extent to which an organisation ensures its members – 
those that formally ‘own’ the organisation – have equitable 
control over the decision-making process. In order for 
the revised Global Accountability Framework to remain 
an effective tool for improving the accountability of global 
actors, whatever form they take, we have therefore made 
a number of revisions in this section. 
5.8 Assessing good governance 
A problem we have confronted with assessing 
an organisation’s member control, is that some 
organisations do not have ‘members’, but are rather 
governed by independent directors or trustees. In 
these organisations, directors are elected based on 
expertise and merit rather than their ability to represent 
‘member’ interests. We have faced similar challenges 
with companies that are privately owned or family run. 
Given that our assessment of companies is based on the 
ability of shareholders to influence decision-making, when 
a single family owns all of the shares, a number of our 
indicators become redundant. 
In order to overcome these two challenges, we 
have developed a new indicator which replaces the 
member control indicators in the case of non-member 
organisations, and tests the adherence of the organisation 
to good governance practice. The contents of this 
indicator have been drawn from established good 
governance principles such as Panel on Non-profit 
Sector 18 and OECD Principles for Good Corporate 
Governance.19 They include the following: that a clear 
procedure is in place for the recruitment of board 
members; that there are clear term limits and number of 
consecutive terms a board member can serve; that the 
majority of the board is independent; and that the CEO 
and Chair are not the same person. 
5.9 Equality of votes vs. efficiency in 
decision-making 
Over the past years we have struggled internally with 
the principle defended by many campaigners that 
equality of vote and representation (one member, one 
vote) guarantees the greatest level of equity in terms of 
influence in decision-making. In reality however, a more 
nuanced view may be required. The weighted voting 
practices of some organisations have long historical 
roots, and are also related to how decision-making power 
is allocated on the basis of varying levels of material 
ownership. For instance, publicly listed corporations 
allocate voting rights according to shares. As long as the 
shares are worth equal votes, this has been accepted, 
and was not contested during the consultations. At 
the same time, some public financial bodies, such as 
international financial institutions which operate on a 
similar basis, were subject to a drive towards a one 
member one, vote system, primarily because of their 
public nature. On the other hand, some public bodies 
have very egalitarian systems in formal terms, but resort 
to very openly displayed practices which effectively 
limit access to decision-making for the majority of their 
members. In all cases, a push for a one-size-fits-all 
system requiring one member, one vote is countered with 
arguments about the need to accept trade-offs between 
efficiency and accountability. 
With the introduction of the scaled scoring system, we 
have the space to introduce nuance into the scoring. 
Organisations that operate a system where some 
members have more voting power than others can still 
receive points if they can demonstrate ways in which 
these inequalities are at least partially addressed, for 
example through double majority voting, caps on voting 
power, and regional or other quotas that balance other 
nominal weight. However, to achieve the maximum 
score, organisations need to demonstrate a firmly 
established system that ensures equality in access to 
decision-making. 
18
 Panel on the Non-profit Sector (2007) Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practices: a guide for charities and foundations, Independent 
Sector http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/report/principles/Principles_Guide.pdf
18
 OECD (2004) OECD Principles for Good Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf 
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5.10 Dealing with decentralised 
organisational structures:  
a new methodology
In response to the feedback that the Global Accountability 
Report is ill-equipped to assess decentralised structures, 
in the future we will use a methodology that allows 
us to better capture the ways in which federated and 
networked organisations work. The key question is 
where policy on accountability issues is set within the 
organisations, and where the systems of oversight and 
compliance sit. For organisations where policy is set at 
headquarters and there is a clear line of authority that 
passes down the organisation, the existing methodology 
will be used (option 1). In organisations where policies 
related to accountability are set at the national level, 
and where consequently systems of oversight and 
compliance vary from country to country, we will sample 
three national offices and produce an average score. 
The criteria we will use to choose which national offices 
to sample will reflect both financial and operational size. 
The spread of scores across the sample will be reflected 
in the overall score for that organisation (option 2). In 
cases where policies related to accountability are agreed 
internationally, but compliance and oversight systems 
exist only at national level, we will again use the same 
sample methodology (option 3). Rather than the One 
World Trust determining which methodology to use, 
assessed organisations will be asked to identify which 
approach best fits the realities of their organisation at the 
beginning of the assessment process. 
5.11 Cross-referencing and interfacing 
with data and results from other 
accountability performance frameworks
The consultation sent a clear message that the Global 
Accountability Report needs to coordinate with other 
initiatives effectively so as to reduce the reporting 
burden of organisations and to avoid duplicate 
information requests. In the NGO sector for example, 
an organisation might find itself providing information 
to HAP, the INGO Charter, the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian response (SCHR), the Disaster Emergency 
Committee, and People in Aid. A company might collect 
information to report against the Global Compact and 
GRI reporting standards, while also submitting self-
assessments to Business in the Community and the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index. In any one year, an IGO 
from within the family of Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) may undergo a peer assessment through the 
Common Performance Assessment System, a third party 
assessment from its funders through the Multilateral 
Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), and an 
assessment from a bilateral donor such as DfID, who 
uses its own performance assessment framework (the 
Multilateral Effectiveness Framework).
While we made efforts to draw on such data already in 
2008, we recognise that more could be done. To facilitate 
access to relevant data, the assessment process using 
the new framework now involves a search of recognised 
accountability performance reports in which relevant data 
may be contained at the baseline inquiry stage (see Figure 
2 opposite), coupled with information gained in relation to 
the new indicator in the accountability strategy dimension 
that tests an organisation’s commitment to other existing 
external accountability principles or frameworks. 
This will be complemented by guidance notes for the 
assessors cross-referencing the new Global Accountability 
Report indicators with indicators used by other key 
recognised assessments or reporting formats. This 
identifies overlaps and sources where we may be able 
to gather information rather than from the organisation 
itself. However, this approach does not come without its 
challenges. At present the information used to score an 
organisation in the Global Accountability Report is closely 
scrutinised by the One World Trust, and we have control 
over its quality and can guarantee it to the assessed 
organisations. Any information used from third parties, 
especially those that are reliant on self-reported data, will 
need to pass a confidence and integrity test to ensure 
that the data is accurate.
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Figure 2: Typical stages in the assessment process
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Pathways to Accountability II – the revised indicator framework 
Like its predecessor, the 2011 Pathways to Accountability 
II is intended for practical use: to measure and create new 
empirical data about the accountability capabilities of one 
or several organisations operating at global level, foster 
insight and awareness of good accountability practice, 
and encourage cross-sector learning and organisational 
reform. All this is done and promoted with the continuing 
challenges in mind that global organisations face in their 
involvement in global governance. Not only are there 
persisting concerns about the ability of both individual 
organisations and the system as a whole to deliver global 
public goods effectively and efficiently to citizens, but the 
power relationships between global actors and those 
whom they serve, or should at least not cause any harm 
to, remain heavily skewed in favour of the institutions. 
Thus, despite much progress, set out in section 2 
above, there are manifold challenges to be addressed. 
The new Global Accountability Framework can help 
to do so with its unique global level and cross-sector 
6.0 Pathways to Accountability II 
– the revised indicator framework 
Figure 3: The new global accountability framework
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comparative approach. However, neither the 2005 
iteration, nor the revised and new Global Accountability 
Framework and Report of 2011 are the only ways to 
research, review and promote progress on accountability 
reform among global actors. The conceptual approach 
of the Framework as well as the findings of the Report 
needs to be understood in the context of the various 
initiatives that exist on accountability. Certainly the Global 
Accountability Framework and Report cannot, and do 
not, intend to provide all answers to the question of how a 
very fragmented and inchoate global governance system 
can be brought to improve its quality of delivery of global 
public goods to citizens. 
Nevertheless, the cross-sector approach pursued by the 
Global Accountability Framework and Report, and again 
endorsed in the consultation, makes the important point 
that powerful and influential organisations, whether directly 
mandated to provide global public goods to citizens or 
not, are by virtue of their impact on people’s lives subject 
to scrutiny of their way of working, and called upon to live 
up to common accountability principles. This entails an 
approach to accountability which emphasises the diverse 
nature of accountability relationships with stakeholders 
that organisations need to balance, and that the onus is 
on the powerful institutions to prevent harm, demonstrate 
accountability, and to empower citizens to hold them to 
account on a continuing basis. 
To strengthen the visibility of this approach we have also 
reviewed the working definition of accountability that we 
use, to read as follows:
Accountability is the process through which an 
organisation actively creates, and formally structures, 
balanced relationships with its diverse stakeholders, 
empowering these to hold it to account over its 
decisions, activities and impacts, with a view to 
continuously improve the organisation’s delivery 
against its mission.
This definition again emphasises that traditional binary 
forms of accountability are no longer appropriate for 
understanding accountability in the context of multi-
level governance. Simple principal-agent models of 
accountability, whether involving the state or other 
powerful entities, are ill-equipped to provide those affected 
by a global or regional decision with an adequate voice 
in how that decision is made. The increasing complexity 
and density of the relationships between actors across 
national, regional, and global levels are therefore leading 
not only to an emergence of a multitude of accountability 
gaps, but also to an increasingly recognised need to fill 
such gaps with appropriate organisational accountability 
policy and management practice. 
The following revised indicator framework is an empirically 
grounded attempt to help organisations, researchers 
and stakeholders in global governance decisions to do 
promote changes in this direction.
Pathways to 
Accountability II 
The revised indicator framework
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1. Accountability Strategy 
Indicator              Explanation Score 
1.1  Stakeholder 
mapping and 
prioritisation
The	organisation	does	not	identify	its	stakeholders	on	its	website	or	in	any	organisational	documents	 0
The	organisation	identifies	some	of	its	stakeholders	on	its	website	or	in	an	organisational	document;	however,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	has	been	informed	by	a	
systematic	mapping	process
1
The	organisation	identifies	its	stakeholders	and	which	ones	are	priority;	this	has	been	informed	by	a	systematic	mapping	process	which	has	been	documented;	but	a	description	of	
this	process	is	not	made	public	
2
The	organisation	identifies	its	stakeholders	and	which	ones	are	priority;	this	has	been	informed	by	a	systematic	mapping	process	which	has	been	documented;	a	description	of	this	
process	is	made	publicly	available
3
1.2  Accountability 
mapping and 
action plan 
The	organisation	does	not	identify	in	a	single	source	(document	or	webpage),	the	mechanisms	and	processes	it	currently	has	in	place	for	delivering	accountability	to	each	of	its	
stakeholder	groups	
0
The	organisation	identifies	in	a	single	source	(document	or	webpage),	the	mechanisms	and	processes	it	currently	has	in	place	for	delivering	accountability	to	each	of	its	
stakeholder	groups;	however,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	development	of	these	mechanisms	and	processes	was	informed	by	a	systematic	mapping	process
1
The	organisation	identifies	in	a	single	source	(document	or	webpage),	the	mechanisms	and	processes	it	currently	has	in	place	for	delivering	accountability	to	each	of	its	
stakeholder	groups;	the	development	of	these	mechanisms	and	processes	was	informed	by	a	systematic	mapping	process	which	was	documented;	there	is	no	evidence	that	a	
plan	of	action	for	plugging	gaps	has	been	developed
2
The	organisation	identifies	in	a	single	source	(document	or	webpage),	the	mechanisms	and	processes	it	currently	has	in	place	for	delivering	accountability	to	each	of	its	
stakeholder	groups;	the	development	of	these	mechanisms	and	processes	was	informed	by	a	systematic	mapping	process	which	was	documented;	based	on	this	mapping	a	plan	
of	action	has	been	developed	that	identifies	how	gaps	will	be	plugged;	a	plan	for	monitoring	implementation	is	in	place,	and	the	action	plan	has	been	resourced
3
1.3  Commitment to 
and awareness of 
existing external 
accountability 
commitments
The	organisation	has	not	committed	itself	to	meet	requirements	of	external	accountability	standards	or	frameworks	(e.g.	it	has	not	signed	up	to	any	codes	of	conduct,	principles	or	
standards)
0
The	organisation	has	committed	itself	to	meet	requirements	of	one	or	more	external	accountability	standards	or	frameworks	(e.g.	the	codes	of	conduct,	principles	and	standards	it	
is	a	member	of);	however,	only	some	of	those	the	organisation	commits	to	are	listed	on	its	website	
1
The	organisation	has	committed	itself	to	meet	requirements	of	several	external	accountability	standards	or	frameworks	(e.g.	the	codes	of	conduct,	principles	and	standards	it	is	a	
member	of);	these	are	listed	in	one	place	on	its	website;	but	there	is	no	evidence	that	compliance	with	these	commitments	is	monitored	and	reported	on
2
The	organisation	has	committed	itself	to	meet	requirements	of	several	external	accountability	standards	or	frameworks	(e.g.	the	codes	of	conduct,	principles	and	standards	it	is	a	
member	of);	these	are	listed	in	one	place	on	its	website	with	information	on	the	countries	/	operations	where	these	are	applied;	a	clear	plan	is	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reporting	
on	compliance	with	each	of	these	commitments,	with	key	people	responsible	for	overseeing	each	initiative	identified
3
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2. Transparency
2. Transparency 
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
2.1  Transparency 
Policy
The	organisation	has	no	formal	position	on	information	disclosure	or	only	makes	a	vague	commitment	to	being	transparent	in	its	communication	material	(website,	annual	reports) 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	transparency	in	a	core	organisational	document	(e.g.	code	of	conduct,	mission,	vision,	values)	but	provides	no	guidance	on	how	this	
commitment	is	implemented;	or	the	organisation	has	a	formal	policy	on	information	disclosure	but	it	only	applies	to	some	activities	and	functions	(e.g.	finances,	customer	care,	
user	details	etc.)
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	policy	which	guides	when	and	what	information	it	will	make	public;	the	policy	is	mandatory	and	applies	to	all	activities	and	functions;	however,	it	is	
not	supported	by	public	guidelines	(e.g.	toolkit)	to	help	staff	and	stakeholders	interpret,	and	staff	implement,	its	provisions
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	policy	which	guides	when	and	what	information	it	will	make	public;	the	policy	is	mandatory	and	applies	to	all	activities	and	functions;	and	it	is	
supported	by	public	guidelines	(e.g.	toolkit)	to	help	staff	and	stakeholders	interpret,	and	staff	implement,	its	provisions
3
2.2  Narrowly defined 
conditions for 
non-disclosure 
The	organisation	does	not	identify	the	conditions	under	/	reasons	for	which	information	will	not	be	disclosed	/	kept	confidential	 0
The	organisation	identifies	the	conditions	under	which	information	will	not	be	disclosed	/	kept	confidential;	however,	these	are	very	broad	in	scope 1
The	organisation	identifies	the	conditions	under	which	information	will	not	be	disclosed	/	kept	confidential;	these	are	both	narrow	and	well-defined;	its	approach	to	transparency,	
however,	is	not	grounded	in	the	presumption	of	disclosure	(that	all	information,	other	than	what	is	deemed	confidential,	is	open	to	the	public	either	upon	request	or	proactively	
disclosed)
2
The	organisation	identifies	the	conditions	under	which	information	will	not	be	disclosed	/	kept	confidential;	these	are	both	narrow	and	well-defined;	its	approach	to	transparency	is	
grounded	in	the	presumption	of	disclosure	(that	all	information,	other	than	what	is	deemed	confidential,	is	open	to	the	public	either	upon	request	or	proactively	disclosed)	
3
2.3  Commitment 
to respond to 
all information 
requests
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	respond	to	requests	for	information 0
The	organisation	makes	a	public	commitment	to	respond	to	information	requests;	however	this	only	applies	to	certain	stakeholders	(e.g.	media,	shareholders,	donors) 1
The	organisation	makes	a	public	commitment	to	respond	to	information	requests	from	any	stakeholder	and	provide	a	justification	for	any	denial;	the	process	for	making	requests,	
however,	is	not	clear	and	no	timeframes	for	responding	are	provided	
2
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	respond	to	all	requests	for	information	from	any	stakeholder	and	provide	a	justification	for	any	denial;	the	process	to	request	information	
is	clearly	detailed	and	there	are	clear	timeframes	for	responding
3
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2. Transparency 
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
2.4  Information 
appeals process 
The	organisation	has	no	process	through	which	a	stakeholder	can	formally	appeal	a	rejected	request	for	information	 0
The	organisation	has	a	process	through	which	a	stakeholder	can	formally	appeal	a	request	for	information	that	is	rejected;	however,	the	appeals	process	only	involves	internal	
stakeholders
1
The	organisation	has	a	process	through	which	a	stakeholder	can	formally	appeal	a	request	for	information	that	is	rejected;	the	appeals	process	is	made	up	of	a	mix	of	internal	and	
external	stakeholders
2
The	organisation	has	a	process	through	which	a	stakeholder	can	formally	appeal	a	request	for	information	that	is	rejected;	the	appeals	process	is	made	up	of	a	mix	of	internal	and	
external	stakeholders;	the	body	reports	directly	to	the	board	
3
2.5  Stakeholder 
involvement 
in policy 
development 
There	was	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	approach	to	/	policy	on	transparency 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	approach	to	/	policy	on	transparency	 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	approach	to	/	policy	on	transparency;	informal	/	ad	hoc	consultations	were	held	with	
some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	transparency;	a	systematic	consultation	was	also	held	with	a	
wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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2. Transparency
2. Transparency 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators              
Explanation Score 
2.6  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	ensuring	the	organisation	is	open	and	transparent 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	ensuring	the	organisation	is	open	and	transparent;	however,	this	responsibility	is	not	a	formal	part	of	his	/	
her	(their)	job	description(s)
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	ensuring	the	organisation	is	open	and	transparent;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	
description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	ensuring	transparency	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	international,	etc.)	
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	ensuring	the	organisation	is	open	and	transparent;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	
description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	ensuring	openness	and	transparency	are	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	international	etc.)	
3
2.7  Building staff 
capacity 
The	organisation	provides	no	guidance	or	support	to	staff	in	implementing	its	commitments	to	transparency	 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	of	the	following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	transparency
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
3
2.8  Dissemination of 
commitments
The	organisation's	transparency	policy	/	commitment	to	transparency	is	not	mentioned	on	the	website	or	in	public	reports 0
The	organisation's	transparency	policy	/	commitment	to	transparency	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	however,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	there	is	a	
dissemination	plan	for	making	it	widely	available	to	key	stakeholders		
1
The	organisation's	transparency	policy	/	commitment	to	transparency	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	a	basic	dissemination	plan	is	in	place	for	making	it	more	
widely	available;	this	does	not,	however,	recognise	the	accessibility	needs	of	different	stakeholders
2
The	organisation's	transparency	policy	/	commitment	to	transparency	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	there	is	a	dissemination	plan	that	recognises	the	accessibility	
needs	of	key	stakeholders;	the	plan	proposes	appropriate	strategies	for	making	the	commitments	accessible	to	them
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2. Transparency 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators              
Explanation Score 
2.9  Rewards and 
incentives 
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	open	and	transparent	behaviour	among	staff	 0
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	open	and	transparent	behaviour	among	staff;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	practices	to	this	effect	 1
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	open	and	transparent	behaviour	among	staff	 2
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	open	and	transparent	behaviour	among	staff;	relevant	staff	have	transparency-related	targets	built	into	their	job	descriptions	and	
are	appraised	against	these	annually
3
2.10  Quality 
management 
systems
The	organisation	has	no	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	commitments	to	transparency	 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	commitments	to	transparency;	however,	there	is	evidence	
of	monitoring	among	individual	departments	/	units	/	sections
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	commitments	to	transparency;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	and	disseminated	internally
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	commitments	to	transparency;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	for	internal	and	external	dissemination	(these	report	on	the	number	of	information	requests	received,	number	denied	and	the	justifications)
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3a. Participation – External Stakeholders
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
3a.1  Stakeholder 
engagement 
policy
The	organisation	has	no	policy	for	guiding	its	engagement	with	external	stakeholders,	or	only	makes	a	commitment	to	stakeholder	engagement	in	communications	material	
(website,	annual	reports)	
0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	engage	with	external	stakeholders	in	core	organisation	documents	(e.g.	code	of	conduct,	mission,	vision,	values),	or	has	a	policy	that	
guides	engagement	with	at	least	one	of	the	identified	external	stakeholder	groups	
1
The	organisation	has	a	policy(ies)	that	guide(s)	engagement	with	external	stakeholders;	the	policy(ies)	applies(y)	to	several	of	the	identified	external	stakeholder	groups 2
The	organisation	has	a	policy(ies)	which	guide(s)	engagement	with	external	stakeholders;	the	policy(ies)	applies(y)	to	the	majority	of	the	identified	external	stakeholder	groups;	
and	is	(are)	supported	by	public	implementation	guidelines	which	provide	support	to	stakeholders	and	staff	on	how	to	effectively	realise	the	commitment	to	engagement
3
3a.2  Process 
commitments 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitments	on	how	it	will	consult	with	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	one	of	the	following	in	relation	to	one	external	stakeholder	group:	
• Ensuring	a	balance	of	stakeholder	voices	in	a	consultation	process
• Providing	necessary	information	to	stakeholders	in	advance	of	a	consultation
• Feeding	back	the	outcomes	of	a	consultation	to	stakeholders	once	it	is	complete
1
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	two	of	the	following	in	relation	to	several	identified	external	stakeholder	groups:	
• Ensuring	a	balance	of	stakeholder	voices	in	a	consultation	process
• Providing	necessary	information	to	stakeholders	in	advance	of	a	consultation
• Feeding	back	the	outcomes	of	a	consultation	to	stakeholders	once	it	is	complete
2
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	all	of	the	following	in	relation	to	the	majority	of	identified	external	stakeholder	groups:	
• Ensuring	a	balance	of	stakeholder	voices	in	a	consultation	process
• Providing	necessary	information	to	stakeholders	in	advance	of	a	consultation
• Feeding	back	the	outcomes	of	a	consultation	to	stakeholders	once	it	is	complete
3
3a.3  Stakeholder 
involvement 
in policy 
development 
There	was	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement	 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement;	informal	/	ad	hoc	consultations	were	held	
with	some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement;	a	systematic	consultation	was	also	held	
with	a	wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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3a. Participation – External Stakeholders
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators                  
Explanation Score 
3a.4  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	overseeing	the	process	of	engaging	with	external	stakeholders	 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	process	of	engaging	with	external	stakeholders;	however,	this	responsibility	is	not	a	formal	
part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	engagement	with	external	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	
description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	ensuring	stakeholder	engagement,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit	
etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	engagement	with	external	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	
description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	overseeing	stakeholder	engagement	are	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit	etc.)	
3
3a.5  Building staff 
capacity
The	organisation	provides	no	support	or	guidance	to	staff	in	engaging	with	external	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	of	the	
following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:	
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	external	stakeholder	engagement
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
3
3a.6  Dissemination of 
commitments 
The	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement	and	details	of	the	opportunities	open	to	external	stakeholders	for	engagement	are	not	mentioned	on	the	website	or	
in	public	reports
0
The	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement	and	details	of	the	opportunities	open	to	external	stakeholders	for	engagement	are	made	publicly	available	through	
the	website;	however,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	a	dissemination	plan	is	in	place	for	making	them	widely	available	to	key	stakeholders		
1
The	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement	and	details	of	the	opportunities	open	to	external	stakeholders	for	engagement	are	made	publicly	available	through	
the	website;	a	basic	dissemination	plan	is	in	place	for	making	them	more	widely	available;	this	does	not,	however,	recognise	the	accessibility	needs	of	different	stakeholders
2
The	organisation's	policy	on	external	stakeholder	engagement	and	details	of	the	opportunities	for	external	stakeholders	to	engage	are	made	publicly	available	through	the	
website;	dissemination	plans	are	also	in	place	that	recognise	the	accessibility	needs	of	different	external	stakeholders;	the	plans	propose	appropriate	strategies	for	making	the	
commitments	accessible	to	them
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3a. Participation – External Stakeholders
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators                  
Explanation Score 
3a.7  Rewards and 
incentives 
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	engage	with	external	stakeholders	 0
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	engage	with	external	stakeholders;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	practices	to	this	effect	 1
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	engage	with	key	stakeholders 2
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	engage	with	key	stakeholders;	relevant	staff	have	engagement-related	targets	built	into	their	job	descriptions	and	are	
appraised	against	these	annually
3
3a.8  Quality 
management 
systems
The	organisation	has	no	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	if	and	how	staff	are	engaging	with	external	stakeholders 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	if	and	how	staff	are	engaging	with	external	stakeholders	in	activities	and	processes;	however,	there	is	
evidence	of	monitoring	among	individual	departments	/	units	/	sections
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	if	and	how	staff	are	engaging	with	external	stakeholders	in	activities	and	processes;	
reports	on	performance	are	produced	periodically;	however,	reports	are	only	disseminated	internally
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	if	and	how	staff	are	engaging	external	stakeholders	in	activities	and	processes;	
reports	on	performance	are	produced	periodically	for	internal	and	external	dissemination
3
3a.9  Stakeholder 
engagement in 
senior decision-
making
The	organisation	has	no	mechanism	through	which	external	stakeholders	can	engage	directly	with	senior	management	/	governing	bodies	 0
The	organisation	has	a	mechanism	through	which	one	external	stakeholder	group	can	engage	directly	with	senior	management	/	governing	bodies 1
The	organisation	has	a	mechanism	through	which	several	external	stakeholder	groups	can	engage	directly	with	senior	management	/	governing	bodies	and	the	process	for	
becoming	involved	is	clear;	however,	advice	/	input	to	senior	management	/	governing	bodies	is	not	made	public	
2
The	organisation	has	a	mechanism	through	which	several	external	stakeholder	groups	can	engage	directly	with	senior	management	/	governing	bodies;	the	process	for	becoming	
involved	is	clear;	advice	/	input	to	senior	management	/	governing	bodies	is	made	public
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3b. Participation – Internal member control/good governance
Indicators                  Explanation Score 
3b.1  Member Control 
of highest 
decision-making 
body
Not	all	members	of	the	organisation	are	represented	in	the	highest	decision-making	body	and	/	or	the	rules	through	which	votes	are	allocated	are	not	clearly	formulated	and	public 0
All	members	are	represented	at	the	highest	decision-making	body	but	are	not	guaranteed	equal	votes	in	it,	and	there	are	no	measures	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	in	
access	to	decision-making	this	causes;	the	rules	through	which	votes	are	allocated	are	clear	and	public;	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	however,	a	single	member	can	
block	changes	to	the	governing	articles.
1
All	members	have	equal	votes	at	the	highest	decision-making	body,	or	if	they	do	not,	the	organisation	has	put	in	place	measures	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	
double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.);	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	no	single	member	can	block	changes	to	the	governing	articles;	but	
additional	formal	mechanisms	exist	in	which	high	level	decisions	are	effectively	determined	or	negotiated	(such	as	formalised	deliberative	practices),	to	which	not	all	members	are	
guaranteed	access	/	equal	representation	and	no	mechanisms	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes
2
All	members	have	equal	votes	at	the	highest	decision-making	body,	or	if	they	do	not,	the	organisation	has	put	in	place	measures	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	
double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.);	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	no	single	member	can	block	changes	to	the	governing	articles;	and	
either	there	are	no	additional	formal	mechanisms	in	which	high	level	decisions	are	effectively	determined	or	negotiated	(such	as	formalised	deliberative	practices),	or	measures	are	
in	place	which	counteract	the	imbalances	such	mechanisms	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.)
3
3b.2  Member Control 
at executive body 
The	organisation	does	not	fulfil	any	or	fulfils	only one	of	the	following	in	relation	to	its	executive	body:	
• The	organisation’s	members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
0
The	organisation	ensures	two	of	the	following	in	relation	to	its	executive	body:
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)	
1
The	organisation	ensures	three	of	the	following	at	its	executive	body:
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
2
The	organisation	ensures	all	of	the	following	at	its	executive	body:	
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members	
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	double	majority,	regional	
thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
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3b. Participation – Internal member control/good governance
Indicators                  Explanation Score 
3b.1  Member Control 
of highest 
decision-making 
body
Not	all	members	of	the	organisation	are	represented	in	the	highest	decision-making	body	and	/	or	the	rules	through	which	votes	are	allocated	are	not	clearly	formulated	and	public 0
All	members	are	represented	at	the	highest	decision-making	body	but	are	not	guaranteed	equal	votes	in	it,	and	there	are	no	measures	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	in	
access	to	decision-making	this	causes;	the	rules	through	which	votes	are	allocated	are	clear	and	public;	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	however,	a	single	member	can	
block	changes	to	the	governing	articles.
1
All	members	have	equal	votes	at	the	highest	decision-making	body,	or	if	they	do	not,	the	organisation	has	put	in	place	measures	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	
double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.);	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	no	single	member	can	block	changes	to	the	governing	articles;	but	
additional	formal	mechanisms	exist	in	which	high	level	decisions	are	effectively	determined	or	negotiated	(such	as	formalised	deliberative	practices),	to	which	not	all	members	are	
guaranteed	access	/	equal	representation	and	no	mechanisms	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes
2
All	members	have	equal	votes	at	the	highest	decision-making	body,	or	if	they	do	not,	the	organisation	has	put	in	place	measures	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	
double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.);	all	members	can	add	items	to	the	agenda;	no	single	member	can	block	changes	to	the	governing	articles;	and	
either	there	are	no	additional	formal	mechanisms	in	which	high	level	decisions	are	effectively	determined	or	negotiated	(such	as	formalised	deliberative	practices),	or	measures	are	
in	place	which	counteract	the	imbalances	such	mechanisms	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision	making	etc.)
3
3b.2  Member Control 
at executive body 
The	organisation	does	not	fulfil	any	or	fulfils	only one	of	the	following	in	relation	to	its	executive	body:	
• The	organisation’s	members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
0
The	organisation	ensures	two	of	the	following	in	relation	to	its	executive	body:
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)	
1
The	organisation	ensures	three	of	the	following	at	its	executive	body:
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	may	cause	(e.g.	double	majority,	
regional	thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
2
The	organisation	ensures	all	of	the	following	at	its	executive	body:	
• Members	are	able	to	nominate	candidates	for	all	executive	board	seats
• Members	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	executive
• Candidates	for	the	executive	body	are	elected	by	a	majority	of	equal	votes	cast	by	members	
• Members	of	the	executive	body	have	an	equal	number	of	votes	or	if	they	do	not,	measures	are	in	place	to	counteract	the	imbalances	this	causes	(e.g.	double	majority,	regional	
thresholds,	caps,	co-decision-making	etc.)
3
3b. Participation – Internal member control/good governance
Indicators Explanation Score 
3b.3  Good governance 
(to be used when 
an organisation 
does not have 
members)
The	organisation:
• Has	no	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Has	no	clear	term	limits	and	no	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• Does	not	have	a	majority	of	the	board	that	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• Has	a	CEO	and	Chair	that	are	the	same	person
0
The	organisation	ensures	two	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
1
The	organisation	ensures	three	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
2
The	organisation	ensures	all	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
3
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3b. Participation – Shareholder control/good governance
Indicators Explanation Score 
3b.4  Equitable 
shareholder 
control at the 
AGM
Not	all	shareholders	are	represented	at	the	AGM 0
The	organisation	ensures	that	all	shareholders	are	represented	at	the	AGM 1
The	organisation	ensures	that	all	shareholders	are	represented	at	the	AGM;	and	that	all	shareholders	with	1%	or	more	of	shares	can	add	items	to	the	agenda	of	the	AGM 2
The	organisation	ensures	that	all	shareholders	are	represented	at	the	AGM;	that	all	shareholders	with	1%	or	more	of	shares	can	add	items	to	the	agenda	of	the	AGM;	there	is	no	
exception	to	the	one	share	one	vote	rule	
3
3b.5  Shareholder 
control of 
the Board of 
Directors
The	organisation’s:
• Shareholders	are	unable	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	Board	of	Directors
• Board	of	Directors	is	not	elected	by	a	majority	vote	of	the	shareholders
• Shareholders	are	unable	to	nominate	candidates	to	the	Board	individually	or	in	aggregate	with	other	shareholders,	if	they	have	3%	or	less	of	shares
0
The	organisation	ensures	one	of	the	following:
• Shareholders	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	Board	of	Directors
• Board	of	Directors	is	elected	by	a	majority	vote	of	the	shareholders
• Shareholders	holding,	individually	or	in	aggregate	with	other	shareholders,	3%	or	less	of	shares	can	nominate	candidates	to	the	Board
1
The	organisation	ensures	two	of	the	following:
• Shareholders	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	Board	of	Directors
• Board	of	Directors	is	elected	by	a	majority	vote	of	the	shareholders
• Shareholders	holding,	individually	or	in	aggregate	with	other	shareholders,	3%	or	less	of	shares	can	nominate	candidates	to	the	Board
2
The	organisation	ensures	all	of	the	following:	
• Shareholders	are	able	to	initiate	a	process	of	dismissal	of	individuals	on	the	Board	of	Directors
• Board	of	Directors	is	elected	by	a	majority	vote	of	the	shareholders
• Shareholders	holding,	individually	or	in	aggregate	with	other	shareholders,	3%	or	less	of	shares	can	nominate	candidates	to	the	Board
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3b. P
articipation – Internal m
em
ber control/good governance
3b. Participation – Shareholder control/good governance
Indicators Explanation Score 
3b.6  Good governance 
(to be used when 
an organisation 
is private or 
family owned 
The	organisation:
• Has	no	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Has	no	clear	term	limits	and	no	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• Does	not	have	a	majority	of	the	board	that	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation
• Has	a	CEO	and	Chair	that	are	the	same	person
0
The	organisation	ensures	two	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
1
The	organisation	ensures	three	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	was	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
2
The	organisation	ensures	all	of	the	following	at	its	governing	body:
• A	clear	procedure	for	recruitment	of	board	members	which	is	open	to	a	broad	field	of	candidates
• Clear	term	limits	and	a	cap	on	the	number	of	consecutive	terms	a	board	member	can	serve
• The	majority	of	the	board	can	demonstrate	their	independence	from	the	organisation	
• The	CEO	and	Chair	are	not	the	same	person
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4a. Evaluation (IGOs and INGOs)
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
4a.1  Evaluation policy 
& framework 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	evaluating	its	activities	and	their	impact 0
The	organisation	makes	a	public	commitment	to	evaluation;	however,	it	does	not	have	a	policy	or	formalised	organisation-wide	framework	/	system	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	
learning	and	reporting,	which	guides	when	and	how	it	evaluates	its	activities	and	their	impact
1
The	organisation	has	a	policy	and	/	or	formalised	framework	/	system	in	place	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting,	which	guides	when	and	how	it	evaluates	its	
activities	and	their	impact;	however,	the	organisation	does	not	make	the	policy	publicly	available	
2
The	organisation	has	a	public	policy	on	when	and	how	it	evaluates	its	activities	and	their	impact;	the	organisation	has	in	place	an	organisation-wide	framework	/	system	for	
monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting
3
4a.2  Stakeholder 
engagement, 
transparency 
and learning in 
evaluation  
The	organisation	commits	to	none	of	the	following:	
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	evaluations
• Publicly	disclosing	the	results	of	evaluations
• Using	the	results	from	evaluations	to	influence	future	decision-making
0
The	organisation	commits	to	one	of	the	following:	
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	evaluations
• Publicly	disclosing	the	results	of	evaluations
• Using	the	results	from	evaluations	to	influence	future	decision-making
1
The	organisation	commits	to	two	of	the	following:		
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	evaluations
• Publicly	disclosing	the	results	of	evaluations
• Using	the	results	from	evaluations	to	influence	future	decision-making
2
The	organisation	commits	to	all	of	the	following:
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	evaluations
• Publicly	disclosing	the	results	of	evaluations
• Using	the	results	from	evaluations	to	influence	future	decision-making
3
4a.3  Independence in 
evaluations
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	and	does	not	have	any	procedures	in	place	to	ensure	the	independence	of	evaluations 0
The	organisation	makes	a	general	commitment	to	ensuring	the	independence	of	evaluations 1
The	organisation	has	an	independent	evaluation	function	(the	evaluation	function	and	its	staff	are	not	under	the	control	or	influence	of	decision-makers	who	have	responsibility	for	
the	activities	being	evaluated;	the	unit	reports	evaluation	results	to	the	head	or	deputy	head	of	the	organisation	or	its	governing	board)
2
The	organisation	has	an	independent	evaluation	function	(the	evaluation	function	and	its	staff	are	not	under	the	control	or	influence	of	decision-makers	who	have	responsibility	
for	the	activities	being	evaluated;	the	unit	reports	evaluation	results	to	the	head	or	deputy	head	of	the	organisation	or	its	governing	board)	which	conducts	periodic	evaluations	of	
organisational	activities	and	policy
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O
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4a. Evaluation (IGOs and INGOs)
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
4a.4  Level of 
evaluation 
The	organisation	does	not	commit	to	conducting	evaluations	in	relation	to	specific	issues 0
The	organisation’s	framework	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting	on	performance	requires	evaluations	take	place	at	one	of	the	following	levels:
• Operational	/	field
• Policy	/	thematic	
• Strategic	
1
The	organisation’s	framework	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting	on	performance	requires	evaluations	take	place	at	two	of	the	following	levels:
• Operational	/	field
• Policy	/	thematic	
• Strategic		
2
The	organisation’s	framework	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting	on	performance	requires	evaluations	take	place	at	all	of	the	following	levels:
• Operational	/	field
• Policy	/	thematic	
• Strategic	
3
4a.5  Stakeholder 
involvement 
in policy 
development   
There	was	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	evaluation 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	evaluation 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	evaluation;	informal	/	ad	hoc	consultations	were	held	with	
some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	evaluation;	a	systematic	consultation	was	also	held	with	a	
wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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4a. Evaluation (IGOs and INGOs)
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators              
Explanation Score 
4a.6  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership 
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	overseeing	evaluation	practices	and	processes	in	the	organisation 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	evaluation	practices	and	processes	in	the	organisation;	however,	this	responsibility	is	not	a	formal	
part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	evaluation	practices	and	processes	in	the	organisation;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	
her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	ensuring	evaluation,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit	
etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	evaluation	practices	and	processes	in	the	organisation;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	
her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	ensuring	evaluation	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	are	clearly	mapped	out	(national,	regional,	business	unit	etc.)
3
4a.7  Building staff 
capacity 
The	organisation	provides	no	support	to	staff	on	monitoring	and	evaluation 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff		
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	of	the	following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluation
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
3
4a.8  Rewards and 
incentives 
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	reflection	and	learning	from	evaluation	among	staff	 0
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	reflection	and	learning	from	evaluation	among	staff;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	practices	to	this	effect	 1
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	reflection	and	learning	from	evaluation	among	staff	(e.g.	acting	upon	evaluation	results);	however,	staff	do	not	have	learning	and	
evaluation-related	targets	built	into	their	job	descriptions	
2
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	reflection	and	learning	from	evaluation	among	staff	(e.g.	rewards	for	acting	upon	evaluation	results);	staff	have	learning	and	
evaluation-related	targets	built	into	their	job	descriptions	and	are	appraised	against	these	annually
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4a. Evaluation (IGOs and INGOs)
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators              
Explanation Score 
4a.9  Quality 
management 
systems 
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	quality	of	its	evaluation	practices 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	quality	if	its	evaluation	practices;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	monitoring	among	individual	
departments	/	units	/	sections
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	quality	of	its	evaluation	practices;	however,	this	does	not	include	a	process	for	management	to	
follow	up	on	evaluation	recommendations	and	oversee	their	implementation	
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	quality	of	its	evaluation	practices;	this	includes	a	systematic	process	for	management	to	follow	
up	on	evaluation	recommendations	(e.g.	action	plan	and	/	or	agreement	clearly	stating	responsibilities)	and	oversee	their	implementation	(e.g.	periodic	report	on	the	status	of	
implementation)
3
4a.10  Disseminating 
learning and 
lessons 
The	organisation	has	no	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	and	evaluation	results	internally,	nor	does	it	share	the	results	of	evaluation	with	key	external	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	only	has	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	and	evaluation	results	internally,	or	evaluation	results	are	shared	with	external	stakeholders	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	 1
The	organisation	has	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	and	evaluation	results	internally,	and	there	is	evidence	that	evaluation	results	are	shared	with	
external	stakeholders	on	an	ad	hoc	basis
2
The	organisation	has	a	wide	range	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	and	evaluation	results	internally;	it	also	develops	communications	plans	for	
making	the	results	of	key	evaluations	available	to	external	stakeholders;	these	plans	recognise	the	accessibility	needs	of	different	stakeholders	and	propose	appropriate	outreach	
strategies	
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Environmental Impact 
Policy Indicators              
Explanation Score 
4b.1  Environmental 
Policy  
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment	in	publicity	material;	however,	it	has	no	dedicated	policy	or	formalised	
evaluation	/	improvement	framework	in	place
1
The	organisation	has	an	organisation-wide	policy	/	formalised	framework	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment;	however,	the	organisation	does	not	make	it	
public
2
The	organisation	has	a	publicly-available	organisation-wide	policy	and	formalised	evaluation	and	improvement	in	place	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment 3
4b.2  Process 
commitments 
(transparency 
and feedback)
The	organisation	does	not	commit	to	publicly	reporting	on	its	environmental	performance,	engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	environmental	impact,	or	using	
the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making
0
The	organisation	commits	to	one	of	the	following:
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	environmental	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	environmental	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making	
1
The	organisation	commits	to	two	of	the	following:
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	environmental	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	environmental	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making	
2
The	organisation	commits	to	all	of	the	following:
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	environmental	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	environmental	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making		
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Environmental Impact 
Policy Indicators              
Explanation Score 
4b.3  Environmental 
performance 
targets  
The	organisation	does	not	set	any	environmental	performance	targets 0
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	at least three	of	the	following	areas	that	are	material	to	its	activities:
• Material	usage
• Energy	usage
• Water	usage	(energy	saved	due	to	conservation	and	efficiency	improvements)
• Emissions	(initiatives	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	reductions	achieved)	
• Products	and	services	(initiatives	to	mitigate	environmental	impacts	of	products	and	services)
• Transport
• Biodiversity
1
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	at least four	of	the	following	areas	that	are	material	to	its	activities:
• Material	usage
• Energy	usage
• Water	usage	(energy	saved	due	to	conservation	and	efficiency	improvements)
• Emissions	(initiatives	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	reductions	achieved)	
• Products	and	services	(initiatives	to	mitigate	environmental	impacts	of	products	and	services)
• Transport
• Biodiversity
2
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	all of	the	following	areas	that	are	material	to	its	activities:
• Material	usage
• Energy	usage
• Water	usage	(energy	saved	due	to	conservation	and	efficiency	improvements)
• Emissions	(initiatives	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	reductions	achieved)	
• Products	and	services	(initiatives	to	mitigate	environmental	impacts	of	products	and	services)
• Transport
• Biodiversity
3
4b.4  Stakeholder 
involvement 
in policy 
development 
There	was	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment;	
informal	/	ad	hoc	consultations	were	held	with	some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	/	policy	on	monitoring	and	minimising	its	impact	on	the	environment;	a	
systematic	consultation	was	also	held	with	a	wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Environmental Impact 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators
Explanation Score 
4b.5  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership 
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	organisation’s	environmental	impact	 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	organisation’s	environmental	impact;	however,	this	
responsibility	is	not	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	organisation’s	environmental	impact;	this	responsibility	is	
a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	monitoring	and	assessing	environmental	impact,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	
the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit,	etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	organisation’s	environmental	impact;	this	responsibility	is	a	
formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	monitoring	and	assessing	environmental	impact	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	are	clearly	mapped	out	
(national,	regional,	business	unit,	etc.)
3
4b.6  Building staff 
capacity 
The	organisation	provides	no	support	to	staff	on	monitoring	and	minimising	environmental	impact 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	
of	the	following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	evaluating	and	minimising	environmental	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
3
4b.7  Quality 
management 
systems
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	its	impact	on	the	environment	 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	its	environmental	impact;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	monitoring	among	individual	
departments	/	units	
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	its	environmental	impact;	this	includes	regular	external	reporting	of	performance	on	key	environmental	
performance	indicators;	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	this	information	is	only	assured	through	internal	systems
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring,	reviewing	and	reporting	on	its	environmental	impact;	this	includes	regular	external	reporting	of	performance	against	
key	environmental	performance	indicators;	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	the	information	is	assured	through	both	internal	and	external	systems
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Environmental Impact 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators
Explanation Score 
4b.8  Rewards and 
incentives 
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	monitor	and	reduce	the	organisation’s	impact	on	the	environment	 0
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	monitor	and	reduce	the	organisation’s	impact	on	the	environment;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	practices	to		
this	effect	
1
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	relevant	staff	to	monitor	and	reduce	the	organisation’s	impact	on	the	environment;	however,	related	targets	are	not	built	into	their	
job	descriptions	
2
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	relevant	staff	to	monitor	and	reduce	the	organisation’s	impact	on	the	environment;	related	targets	are	built	into	their	job	
descriptions	and	they	are	appraised	against	these	annually
3
4b.9  Disseminating 
learning and 
lessons
The	organisation	has	no	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	environmental	impact 0
The	organisation	has	a	limited	set	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	environmental	performance	internally	 1
The	organisation	has	a	wide	range	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	environmental	performance	internally;	
there	is	ad	hoc	evidence	that	lessons	are	also	being	shared	externally
2
The	organisation	has	a	wide	range	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	environmental	performance	both	
internally	and	externally
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Social Impact Policy 
Indicators               
Explanation Score 
4b.10  The organisation 
has a specific 
policy that 
guides evaluation 
practice
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	monitoring,	assessing	and	reporting	on	its	social	impact	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	public	commitment	to	monitoring,	assessing	and	reporting	on	its	social	impact;	however,	it	does	not	have	a	policy	or	formalised	organisation-wide	
framework	/	system	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting,	which	guides	when	and	how	it	evaluates	its	activities	and	their	impact
1
The	organisation	has	a	policy	and	/	or	formalised	framework	/	system	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting	on	social	impact	in	place;	however,	it	does	not	make	the	
policy	publicly	available	
2
The	organisation	has	a	public	policy	on	when	and	how	it	evaluates	its	activities	and	their	social	impact;	the	organisation	has	in	place	an	organisation-wide	framework	/	system	for	
monitoring,	evaluating,	learning	and	reporting
3
4b.11  Stakeholder 
engagement and 
transparency
The	organisation	does	not	commit	to	publicly	reporting	on	its	social	performance,	engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	social	impact,	or	using	the	results	of	
reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making	
0
The	organisation	commits	to	one	of	the	following
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	social	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	social	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making
1
The	organisation	commits	to	two	of	the	following
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	social	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	social	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making
2
The	organisation	commits	to	all	of	the	following
• Publicly	reporting	on	its	social	performance
• Engaging	external	stakeholders	in	the	assessment	of	its	social	impact
• Using	the	results	of	reviews	to	inform	future	decision-making
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Social Impact Policy 
Indicators               
Explanation Score 
4b.12  Social 
performance 
targets
The	organisation	does	not	set	performance	targets	on	its	social	impact 0
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	one	of	the	following	areas	that	are	material:
• Human	rights	(includes:	investment	&	procurement	practices,	freedom	of	association	&	collective	bargaining,	child	labour,	security	practices,	indigenous	rights)
• Corruption	
• Influencing	public	policy
• Community	impact	
1
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	two	of	the	following	areas	that	are	material:
• Human	rights	(includes:	investment	&	procurement	practices,	freedom	of	association	&	collective	bargaining,	child	labour,	security	practices,	indigenous	rights)
• Corruption	
• Influencing	public	policy
• Community	impact	
2
The	organisation	sets	performance	targets	in	all	of	the	following	areas	that	are	material:
• Human	rights	(includes:	investment	&	procurement	practices,	freedom	of	association	&	collective	bargaining,	child	labour,	security	practices,	indigenous	rights)
• Corruption	
• Influencing	public	policy
• Community	impact	
3
4b.13  Stakeholder 
engagement and 
transparency
There	was	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact;	informal	/	ad	hoc	
consultations	were	held	with	some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	approach	to	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact;	a	systematic	consultation	was	
also	held	with	a	wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Social Impact Quality 
Management Systems 
Indicators
Explanation Score 
4b.14  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership 
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	organisation’s	social	impact	 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	all	aspects	of	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	however,	this	
responsibility	is	not	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	all	aspects	of	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	this	
responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	
levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit,	etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	monitoring	and	assessment	of	all	aspects	of	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	this	
responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	are	clearly	
mapped	out	(national,	regional,	business	unit,	etc.)
3
4b.15  Building staff 
capacity 
The	organisation	provides	no	support	to	staff	on	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	of	the	
following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	monitoring	and	assessing	social	impact
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff
3
4b.16  Rewards and 
incentives
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	monitor	and	assess	the	organisation’s	social	impact	 0
No	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	staff	to	monitor	and	assess	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	ad	hoc	practices	to	this	effect	 1
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	relevant	staff	to	monitor	and	assess	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	however,	related	targets	are	not	built	into	their	job	
descriptions
2
A	formal	system	exists	to	reward	and	incentivise	relevant	staff	to	monitor	and	assess	the	organisation’s	social	impact;	related	targets	are	built	into	their	job	descriptions	and	they	
are	appraised	against	these	annually
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4b. Social and environmental evaluation (TNCs)
Social Impact Quality 
Management Systems 
Indicators
Explanation Score 
4b.17  Quality 
management 
systems
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact	 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	monitoring	among	individual	departments	/	units	/	
sections
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact;	this	includes	regular	external	reporting	of	performance	on	key	social	performance	
indicators;	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	this	information,	however,	is	only	assured	through	internal	systems
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact;	this	includes	regular	external	reporting	of	performance	against	key	social	
performance	indicators;	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	the	information	is	assured	through	both	internal	and	external	systems
3
4b.18  Disseminating 
learning and 
lessons
The	organisation	has	no	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact 0
The	organisation	has	a	limited	set	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact	internally	 1
The	organisation	has	a	wide	range	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact	internally;	there	is	ad	
hoc	evidence	that	lessons	are	also	being	shared	externally	as	well
2
The	organisation	has	a	wide	range	of	mechanisms	in	place	for	disseminating	and	sharing	lessons	learned	from	monitoring	and	assessing	its	social	impact	both	internally	and	
externally
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5a. Complaints and Response – External 
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
5a.1  External 
complaints  
policy 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	external	stakeholders 1
The	organisation	has	a	specific	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	one	external	stakeholder	group 2
The	organisation	has	a	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	several	external	stakeholder	groups 3
5a.2  Process 
(channels and 
procedure)  
The	organisation	has	no	policy	or	procedures	on	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	provides	a	single	channel	(e.g.	email	address	or	tel.	number)	for	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	to	be	made;	it	provides	no	description	of	the	process	for	
investigating	and	responding	to	complaints
1
The	organisation	offers	multiple	channels	for	external	stakeholders	to	make	complaints;	it	provides	a	basic	description	of	the	complaints	process	 2
The	organisation	offers	external	stakeholders	with	multiple	channels	for	making	a	complaint;	it	provides	a	clear	description	of	the	stages	for	handling,	investigating	and	responding	
to	complaints,	including	timeframes
3
5a.3  Independence of 
investigation 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	ensuring	that	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 0
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 1
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 2
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint;	there	is	a	(are)	mechanism(s)	in	place	for	a	
complainant	to	appeal	a	decision	and	escalate	a	complaint	or,	if	the	complaints	mechanism	is	functionally	independent,	the	independent	complaints	mechanism	reports	directly	to	
the	board
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5a. Complaints and Response – External 
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
5a.4  Protection 
of external 
stakeholders
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	protecting	external	stakeholders	that	make	complaints 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	one	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
1
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	two	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
2
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	all	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
3
5a.5  Stakeholder 
involvement 
in policy 
development
There	was	limited	or	no	consultation	with	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	policy	/	approach	to	handling	external	complaints 0
Some	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	policy	/	approach	to	handling	external	complaints 1
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	policy	/	approach	to	handling	external	complaints;	informal	/	ad	hoc	consultations	
were	held	with	some	external	stakeholders
2
A	wide	range	of	internal	stakeholders	were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	organisation’s	policy	/	approach	to	handling	external	complaints;	a	systematic	consultation	was	also	
held	with	a	wide	range	of	external	stakeholders
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5a. Complaints and Response – External 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators
Explanation Score 
5a.6  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership 
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	handling	of	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	handling	of	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	however,	this	responsibility	is	not	a	formal	
part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)	
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	handling	of	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	
/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	responding	to	complaints,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	
business	unit	etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	the	handling	of	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	
her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	responding	to	complaints	are	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit	etc.)
3
5a.7  Building staff 
capacity
The	organisation	provides	no	support	to	staff	on	how	to	handle	complaints	from	external	stakeholders 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	
of	the	following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	external	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
3
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5a. Complaints and Response – External 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators
Explanation Score 
5a.8  Dissemination of 
commitments 
The	organisation’s	complaints	and	response	policy	/	process	is	not	mentioned	on	the	website	and	/	or	in	public	reports 0
The	organisation’s	complaints	and	response	policy	/	process	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	however,	there	is	no	dissemination	plan	for	making	it	widely	available	
to	key	stakeholders	
1
The	organisation’s	complaints	and	response	policy	/	process	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	a	basic	dissemination	plan	is	in	place	(one-size-fits-all,	no	
contextualisation,	no	provision	for	local	languages)
2
The	organisation’s	complaints	and	response	policy	/	process	is	made	publicly	available	through	the	website;	there	is	a	dissemination	plan	that	recognises	the	accessibility	needs	
of	key	stakeholders	and	proposes	an	outreach	strategy	that	addresses	these	(e.g.	translation	into	appropriate	languages);	furthermore,	this	policy	expresses	a	commitment	to	
overcoming	access	barriers	and	discrimination
3
5a.9  Quality 
Management 
Systems
The	organisation	has	no	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	implementation	of	complaints	and	response	policies 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring,	reviewing	and	learning	from	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	however,	there	is	evidence	of	
monitoring	among	individual	departments	/	units	/	sections	
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring,	reviewing	and	learning	from	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	for	internal	dissemination
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring,	reviewing	and	learning	from	complaints	from	external	stakeholders;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	for	internal	and	external	dissemination	(these	report	on	the	number	of	complaints	received,	resolved	and	rejected,	lessons	learnt)
3
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5b. Complaints and Response – Internal 
Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
5b.1  Whistle-blower 
Policy 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	or	provide	appropriate	protections	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	and	provide	appropriate	protections 1
The	organisation	has	a	specific	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	(whistle-blower	policy) 2
The	organisation	has	a	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	(whistle-blower	policy);	this	applies	to	all	types	of	staff	(full-time,	part-time,	
volunteers,	interns)	and	all	types	of	contractors
3
5b.2  Process 
(channels and 
procedure)
The	organisation	has	no	policy	or	procedures	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	provides	a	single	channel	(e.g.	email	address	or	tel.	number)	for	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	to	be	made;	it	provides	no	description	of	the	process	for	
investigating	and	responding	to	complaints
1
The	organisation	offers	multiple	channels	for	internal	stakeholders	to	make	complaints	and	provides	a	basic	description	of	the	complaints	process	 2
The	organisation	offers	internal	stakeholders	with	multiple	channels	for	making	a	complaint,	and	provides	a	clear	description	of	the	stages	for	handling,	investigating	and	
responding	to	complaints,	including	timeframes
3
5b.3  Independence of 
investigation
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	ensuring	that	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 0
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 1
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 2
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint;	there	is	a	mechanism	in	place	for	a	
complainant	to	appeal	a	decision	and	escalate	a	complaint
3
5b.4  Protection of 
whistle-blowers
The	organisation	makes	no	commitments	to	protecting	internal	stakeholders	that	make	a	complaint 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	one	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
1
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	two	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
2
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	all	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
3
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Policy Indicators              Explanation Score 
5b.1  Whistle-blower 
Policy 
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	or	provide	appropriate	protections	 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	respond	to	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	and	provide	appropriate	protections 1
The	organisation	has	a	specific	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	(whistle-blower	policy) 2
The	organisation	has	a	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	(whistle-blower	policy);	this	applies	to	all	types	of	staff	(full-time,	part-time,	
volunteers,	interns)	and	all	types	of	contractors
3
5b.2  Process 
(channels and 
procedure)
The	organisation	has	no	policy	or	procedures	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	 0
The	organisation	provides	a	single	channel	(e.g.	email	address	or	tel.	number)	for	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	to	be	made;	it	provides	no	description	of	the	process	for	
investigating	and	responding	to	complaints
1
The	organisation	offers	multiple	channels	for	internal	stakeholders	to	make	complaints	and	provides	a	basic	description	of	the	complaints	process	 2
The	organisation	offers	internal	stakeholders	with	multiple	channels	for	making	a	complaint,	and	provides	a	clear	description	of	the	stages	for	handling,	investigating	and	
responding	to	complaints,	including	timeframes
3
5b.3  Independence of 
investigation
The	organisation	makes	no	commitment	to	ensuring	that	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 0
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 1
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint	 2
The	organisation	commits	to	ensuring	those	handling	and	investigating	complaints	are	independent	of	the	subject	of	the	complaint;	there	is	a	mechanism	in	place	for	a	
complainant	to	appeal	a	decision	and	escalate	a	complaint
3
5b.4  Protection of 
whistle-blowers
The	organisation	makes	no	commitments	to	protecting	internal	stakeholders	that	make	a	complaint 0
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	one	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
1
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	two	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
2
The	organisation	makes	a	commitment	to	all	of	the	following:
• Ensuring	the	confidentiality	of	the	complainant	and	identifying	clear	exception	rules	for	a	confidentiality	breach
• Guaranteeing	non-retaliation	towards	complainants
• Sanctioning	those	that	retaliate	against	complainants
3
5b. Complaints and Response – Internal 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators             
Explanation Score 
5b.5  Roles, 
responsibilities 
and leadership 
There	is	(are)	no	named	senior	executive(s)	in	charge	of	overseeing	compliance	with	the	policy	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	 0
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	compliance	with	the	policy	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders;	however,	this	
responsibility	is	not	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s)	
1
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	compliance	with	the	policy	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	
is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	responding	to	internal	complaints,	however,	are	not	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	
organisation	(national,	regional,	business	unit	etc.)
2
There	is	(are)	a	named	senior	executive(s)	that	is	(are)	responsible	for	overseeing	compliance	with	the	policy	on	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders;	this	responsibility	
is	a	formal	part	of	his	/	her	(their)	job	description(s);	roles	and	responsibilities	for	responding	to	internal	complaints	are	clearly	mapped	out	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	(national,	
regional,	business	unit	etc.)
3
5b.6  Building staff 
capacity
The	organisation	provides	no	support	to	staff	in	relation	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders 0
The	organisation	provides	one	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
1
The	organisation	provides	an	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff,	and	additionally	one	
of	the	following:
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
2
The	organisation	provides	all	of	the	following:
• An	overview	of	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	in	the	induction	of	all	new	staff	
• A	toolkit	/	guidelines	to	support	staff	in	implementing	the	organisation’s	commitments	to	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders
• Formal	training	for	relevant	staff	
3
5b.7  Dissemination of 
commitments
The	organisation’s	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	is	(are)	not	disseminated	among	staff 0
The	organisation’s	policy(ies)	on	receiving	and	handling	complaints	from	internal	stakeholders	is	(are)	only	disseminated	among	staff	through	one	or	two	mediums	(e.g.	staff	
handbook,	brochures,	intranet)	
1
The	organisation’s	whistle-blower	policy	is	published	internally	through	a	number	of	different	channels	and	published	on	the	website	and	/	or	in	public	reports 2
The	organisation’s	whistle-blower	policy	is	published	internally	through	different	channels;	the	policy	is	published	on	the	website	and	/	or	in	public	reports	and	is	translated	into	
different	languages	relevant	to	key	stakeholder	groups	
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5b. Complaints and Response – Internal 
Quality Management 
Systems Indicators             
Explanation Score 
5b.8  Quality 
Management 
Systems 
The	organisation	has	no	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	implementation	of	its	internal	complaints	procedures 0
The	organisation	has	no	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	internal	complaints	procedures;	however,	there	is	
evidence	of	monitoring	among	individual	departments	/	units	/	sections	
1
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	internal	complaints	procedures;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	for	internal	dissemination
2
The	organisation	has	a	formal	organisation-wide	system	in	place	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	implementation	of	its	internal	complaints	procedures;	performance	reports	are	
produced	periodically	for	internal	and	external	dissemination	(these	report	on	the	number	of	complaints	received	and	resolved)
3
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Name Organisation
A.D. Long EBRD
Aaron Shane Rosenberg International Finance Corporation
Abigail Taylor ActionAid UK
Aidan Timlin Christian Aid
Alex Macgillivray AccountAbility
Alexander Stoyanov Center for the Study of Democracy
Alice Tepper Marlin Social Accountability
Amar Bhattacharya G24 Secretariat
Ana-Mita Betancourt Inter-American Development Bank
Ane Mygland The Norwegian Development Network
Anna Mae Tuazon Asian Institute of Management
Anna Roggenbuck CEE Bankwatch Network
Barbara Wallace InterAction
Beatrice Edwards Government Accountability Project
Beris Gwynne World Vision International
Biljana Radonjic Ker-Lindsay EBRD
Bill Rastetter Catholic Relief Services
Bruce Jenkins Bank Information Center
Bruno Tissot BIS
Camila Morais Care International
Carlo Francis V. Raymundo Asian Institute of Management
Carole Excell World Resource Institute
Clare Smith Care UK
Clive Bacon World Vision UK
Coralie Bryant New Rules for Global Finance Coalition
Daniel Bradlow International Law Program, American University
Daniela Mineva Center for the Study of Democracy
Deborah Seamark Independent Consultant
Delane Botelho EAESP-FGV
Dr Elizabeth Culbard One World Trust Board of Trustees
Dr Gavin Strang One World Trust Board of Trustees
Dr Sebastian Taylor One World Trust Board of Trustees
Dr. Mohamed Moghram Yemeni Foundation for Transparency and Good Governance
Elizabeth Eyster UNHCR
Emily Horgan IFC
Ezequiel Maman Asian Institute of Management
Felismino Alcarpe EIB
Finona Flores World Intellectual Property Organization
Gijs Jan Brandsma Utrecht University
Grace Williams Oxfam International
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill Oxford University, All Souls College
Hemantha Withanage Centre for Environmental Justice
Hermien Botes Anglo American
We are grateful for the contributions made by the following individuals to the consultation process in the workshops, survey and offering 
of additional comments and reflections.
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Name Organisation
James Hughes Shell
Jan Aarte Scholte Warwick University
Jasper Teulings Greenpeace International
Jean-Philippe Renaut SustainAbility
Jeff Crisp UNHCR
Jeff Oatham Centrica
Jenny Flezzani Pfizer
Jeremy Pope TIRI
Jesse Griffiths Bretton Woods Project
Jo Rowlands Oxfam GB
Jock Baker CARE International
John Christensen Tax Justice Network
John Garrison World Bank
John Gaventa IDS
Johnathan Ng United Nations Development Programme
Jon Entine American Enterprise Institute
Jonathan Ng UNDP
Joss Gillijns International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Judith Moore World Bank
Julia Flores WIPO
Kate Gilmore Amnesty International
Katharina Samara HAP International
Keith Arnold The Nature Conservancy
Ken Berger Charity Navigator
Ken Langford World Health Organization
Ketil Hviding International Monetary Fund
L. David Brown Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations
Lalanika Vasanthi Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Centre
Lord Archer of Sandwell One World Trust Board of Trustees
Luc Demoulin GDF Suez
Lucía Fernández DARA
Lucy Koechlin University of Basel
Lynn Aylward International Monetary Fund
Mahua Sen IPPF
Manana Kochladze Bankwatch
Manoj Juneja FAO
Mark Bovens Utrecht University
Mark Byatt IASB / IASC Foundation
Mark Murphy Cargill Inc.
Martim Maya UNDP
Martin Vielajus Institut pour la Gouvernance Globale
Meg Taylor Compliance advisor/Ombudsman (IFC)
Melissa Fernandez UNICEF
Mike Buchholtz International Labour Organization
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Name Organisation
Mike Davies PricewaterhouseCoopers
Mokhethi Moshoeshoe Civa Innovationa Management
Monica Blagescu HAP International
Monika Kruesmann One World Trust Board of Trustees
Nawel Hamdad Global Environment Facility
Neantro Saavedra-Rivano University of Tsukuba
Nicholas Tree WIPO
Ole Kirkelund Danish Commerce and Companies Agency
Olga Filippova EBRD
Oliver Reichardt One World Trust Board of Trustees
Ovais Sarmad IOM
Paloma Raggo Syracuse University
Patsy Robertson The Commonwealth Association
Paul Begley AccountAbility
Peter Louis Lallas World Bank Inspection Panel
Peter Newell UEA
Philip Tamminga DARA
Prof. Kang Xiaoguang NPO Research Center, Renmin University of China
Ramesh Ramankutty Global Environment Facility
Ricardo Lopes Cardoso FGV
Richard Kirkham University of Sheffield
Robert Sherman Halliburton
Robert Whitfield One World Trust Board of Trustees
Robin Richards Centre for Policy Studies
Salil Tripathi Institute for Human Rights and Business
Sarah Earl IDRC
Sean McKaughan Fundación AVINA
Segbedzi Norgbey UNEP
Sekou Toure Global Environment Facility
Shelley Walden Government Accountability Project
Sheryl Haw HAP International
Silvia Zucchini International Monetary Fund
Lynn Aylward International Monetary Fund
Simon Burall Involve
Simon Early Plan International
Stan Cutzach Transparency International
Steve Lippman Microsoft
Sue Kendall-Bilicki OECD
Suresh R. Sharma World Food Programme
Susanna Wilson HSBC Holdings
Svetlana Spatar The Ecological Society Green Salvation
Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen Turku University
Thabo Rapoo Centre for Policy Studies
Thomas Cierpka IFOAM
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Toby Mendel ARTICLE 19
Todd Landmann University of Essex
Tom Bigg IIED
Tom Seidenstein IASC Foundation
Tony Colman One World Trust Board of Trustees
Tore Skatun United Nations Development Programme
Tosca Bruno-van Vijfeijken Syracuse University
Treasa Dunworth The University of Auckland`
Vanessa Wood One World Trust Board of Trustees
Vasuki Shastry International Monetary Fund
Vera Naegeli Universität Basel
Vijay Naaj International Centre for Human Rights Policy
Wade Hoxtell Global Public Policy Institute
Yoma Winder Oxfam GB
Ziad Abdel Samad ANND
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“I think the Global Accountability Report and the underlying framework is one of the most successful 
attempts to operationalise the notion of public accountability. It moves the debate beyond good 
intentions and abstract promises.” 
“The Global Accountability Report has provided an easy to understand framework for both  
process oriented (transparency and participation) and evaluation focused (evaluation, feedback  
and complaints) accountability measures. It supports a proactive stance towards accountability.” 
“It’s made organisations think about what accountability means and provided a framework that 
organisations can use as a reference point when looking to strengthen their accountability. There’s 
probably no other area where organisations can be objectively compared, particularly non-profits 
where we don’t even have a bottom line.” 
“The Global Accountability Report has provided a common platform to assess the accountability of 
global organisations...The comprehensive framework used by the Global Accountability Report also 
allows organisations to compare their standing with similar organisations and to identify areas they 
should improve on.”
